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Why does the Fourth Amendment distinctly refer to “papers” prior to 
“effects”?  Why should we care? 
The inquiry is interesting for the usual reasons legal history is 
interesting—those who look may find a compelling story that provides the 
surest foundation for understanding modern doctrine.  In this case, however, 
there is an additional and urgent reason for caring about history.  Modern 
doctrine is in deep trouble and needs all the help it can get. 
For more than a century, the Supreme Court adhered to the doctrine of 
Boyd v. United States, granting private papers an extraordinary exemption 
from seizure, even under warrant.
1
  Then, during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court began effectively to equate “papers” 
and “effects.”2  Another line of modern cases established “bright-line 
 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 257–266 (discussing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886)). 
2 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611–12 (1984) (holding that compelled production 
of preexisting documents did not violate Fifth Amendment privilege, excepting testimonial 
character of the act of production); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978) 
(holding that search of newspaper office for photographs, under warrant, did not violate 
Fourth Amendment); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976)  (holding that search 
of law office, and seizure of documents incriminating suspect in fraud, under warrant, did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) 
(holding that compelled production by accountant of client’s documents entrusted to 
accountants did not violate Fifth Amendment). 
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rules”3 that gave the same constitutional treatment to all “effects.”4 
Twenty-first century technology makes these doctrines problematic.  
Portable devices like cell phones and flash drives are “effects” subject to 
search and seizure like briefcases and backpacks.  Given the enormous 
quantity and sensitive content of the information digital devices hold, 
equating them with other “effects” has troubled courts and commentators.5 
In computer search cases, the police may have probable cause and be 
able to describe particularly what they are seeking.  But the disturbing 
feature is the volume of innocent and intimate information that must be 
exposed before the criminal material is discovered.  This pooling of small 
quantities of criminal evidence with large quantities of innocent and 
intimate information is not new.  It appeared in a great controversy over 
general warrants, libels, and seizure of papers that erupted in England in the 
1760s. 
This Article argues that the history of seizing “papers” explains why 
the Amendment uses the term and offers the opportunity to ground special 
Fourth Amendment rules for digital evidence.  For originalist judges the 
pertinence of history is obvious.  History is important, however, for any 
theory of constitutional interpretation more formal than brazen realism.
6
  In 
this instance, history might help to reconcile Fourth Amendment doctrine 
 
3 For application of the usual arguments about rules versus standards to the Fourth 
Amendment context, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth 
Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984) (arguing that Fourth Amendment cases are so 
various that rules are arbitrary and defending particularized rulings in the style of parables); 
Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The 
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127 (arguing for bright-line rules to govern 
recurring patterns of police behavior such as searches incident to arrest). 
4 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991) (holding that warrantless search 
of a container in the trunk of a vehicle where police officers had probable cause to believe 
that only the container, not the rest of the car, contained contraband, did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 825 (1982) (holding that 
the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement permits a warrantless search of any 
container in the vehicle that could contain the suspected evidence or contraband); New York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that search-incident-to-arrest power permits a 
warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment, including containers, of vehicle 
occupied by arrested suspect); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that 
search-incident power extends to all effects on the person of an arrested suspect, including 
containers); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (same). 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 Even for pragmatists and common law constitutionalists, text and history matter—a lot.  
Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 235 (1962) (observing that 
text, history, and precedent “are not irrelevant materials, not ever.  They are empirical aids, 
being deposits of experience; they are sources of inspiration, instigators of reflection, 
producers of mood.  In short, they are the setting for judgment and they condition it, but they 
are not its wellspring”). 
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with the widespread sense that some effects are categorically more private 
than others. 
The Fourth Amendment refers to “papers” because the Founders 
understood the seizure of papers to be an outrageous abuse distinct from 
general warrants.  The English courts and resolutions of the House of 
Commons condemned both abuses distinctly.  The controversy was closely 
followed in America, where colonial Whigs sympathized with, and even 
idolized, John Wilkes, who successfully sued for damages for the seizure of 
his papers.  America inherited the common law ban on searches for papers, 
adopted constitutional provisions that mentioned papers distinctly, and 
refused to modify the common law ban by statute until the Civil War.  The 
one Founding-era attempt to authorize seizing papers by statute was 
condemned as contrary to common law and natural right and never passed 
into law.  Although Congress authorized seizing papers to enforce the 
revenue laws during the Civil War, it took until the 1880s for a challenge to 
reach the Supreme Court.  That challenge was Boyd, which remained the 
law for another ninety years. 
Boyd rightly held that “papers” deserve more constitutional protection 
than “effects.”  Special protection does not, however, ineluctably mean 
absolute immunity.  The seizures that aroused outrage in the 1760s were 
indiscriminate, expropriating, unregulated, and inquisitorial.  A regulated, 
discriminate, and nonrivalrous process for inspecting documents is 
different. 
Indeed, the prohibition on seizing papers was never absolute.  Stolen 
and contraband papers could be seized under warrant, and perhaps papers of 
only evidentiary value could be seized incident to arrest.  Moreover, if the 
Fourth Amendment, as Story said, is “little more than the affirmance of a 
great constitutional doctrine of the common law,”7 the Amendment 
incorporates by reference “a great constitutional doctrine” that was dynamic 
on its own terms, subject to judicial evolution and statutory modification.
8
  
The supposed choice between no special protection for private papers and 
complete immunity for private papers is a false dilemma.   
This Article takes no position on the precise special doctrines that 
should be formulated to prevent promiscuous searches of digitized 
 
7 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895, 
at 748 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
8 See Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal 
Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1121 (2012) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court should overrule pre-Founding English precedents incorporated by 
reference into the Fourth Amendment according to the same criteria that govern overruling 
post-ratification Fourth Amendment precedents). 
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information.  Those depend on costs and benefits, and on institutional 
competence to assess costs and benefits.
9
  The Article claims only that 
courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have legitimate textual and 
historical grounds for treating “papers” and their modern counterparts with 
more respect than other “effects.” 
Part I briefly describes the technological crisis in current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  Part II reviews the history of the controversy over 
general warrants, libels, and the seizure of papers that raged in England 
early in the reign of George III.  Part III turns to the American experience, 
beginning with American awareness of the English controversy before 
considering the post-Independence reception of the ban on seizing papers, 
the adoption of constitutional provisions referring specially to “papers,” and 
Founding-era practices.  Part IV tells the still largely unsuspected story of 
Boyd v. United States.  Part V weighs the accumulated evidence and 
suggests that Boyd’s inflexible ban on seizing private papers, while more 
defensible than modern doctrine’s excision of a word from the 
constitutional text, was not the only legitimate doctrinal way to honor the 
constitutional preference for “papers” over “effects.”  Once we understand 
the special evils the Founders saw in seizing papers, we may conclude that 
searches carefully structured to minimize those evils are not 
“unreasonable.” 
I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CRISIS IN MODERN DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s case law permits the search for and seizure of 
evidence, including documentary evidence, (a) by warrants meeting the 
criteria of the Warrant Clause; (b) without warrants when the police have 
probable cause to believe evidence or contraband may be inside a vehicle;
10
 
and (c) incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause, even without 
particularized suspicion to believe the suspect might destroy evidence or 
reach for a weapon.
11
  When an arrest takes place in public, the police may 
thoroughly search the suspect’s person, including personal items such as 
wallets and notebooks, and may open containers such as briefcases and 
backpacks.
12
  When the arrest takes place indoors, the police, under Chimel 
v. California, may also search areas within the immediate “grabbing range” 
 
9 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857 (2004) (arguing against judicial, as 
opposed to legislative, regulation); Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police 
Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 322–27 (arguing for judicial regulation). 
10 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
11 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 5.2 (4th ed. 2004). 
12 See id. 




  When the arrest takes place in a vehicle, the recent 
decision in Arizona v. Gant directs that police “may search a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of 
arrest.”14 
As Orin Kerr forcefully pointed out, these physical-evidence rules are 
incongruous when applied to digital evidence.
15
  The physical-evidence 
rules permit the police to carry off the suspect’s computer drives and peruse 
every file if they have probable cause to believe such a search will yield a 
single incriminating file.  And when the suspect is arrested while carrying a 
cell phone or thumb drive, a literal application of the predigital search-
incident-to-arrest rules permits the police to read every contact and file 
without probable cause. 
A warrant to search the garage of a suspect’s home for a stolen pickup 
truck does not authorize the police to search the garage of another home 
owned by the same suspect.  That would be a general warrant, which is 
anathema to the Constitution.  Yet while one warrant will not permit law 
enforcement to search two premises for physical evidence, one warrant will 
suffice to read all the files on a personal computer, so long as it particularly 
describes the incriminating files to be seized.  Yet the intrusion on privacy 
from opening the door of the second unit’s garage seems dramatically less 
than that attending the search, file by file, of the family desktop.  Current 
doctrine has gone badly awry in the digital-evidence context. 
A. SEARCHES FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO WARRANT 
OR THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
Once law enforcement agents have built a record of probable cause to 
suspect that incriminating files are present on a suspect’s computer, the 
standard practice is to obtain a warrant to enter the suspect’s premises and 
remove digital storage devices for subsequent search at police 
headquarters.
16
  The practice extends beyond the investigation of crimes 
committed by digital communications.  Given probable cause to suspect 
 
13 See id. § 6.3(b). 
14 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (footnote omitted); see 3 LAFAVE, supra 
note 11, § 7.1(c). 
15 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 279 (2005). 
16 See id. at 288. 
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that a target committed an offense, general information that similar 
offenders sometimes document crimes on their technology can support a 
search warrant. 
For example, in United States v. Burgess, police lawfully stopped the 
suspect’s motor home on the road for the ostensible purpose of traffic 
enforcement.
17
  During the stop a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle, 
establishing probable cause to search the mobile home for drugs.
18
  The 
police found marijuana in the mobile home, arrested Burgess, and 
impounded the vehicle.
19
  Inside the vehicle the police also found a laptop 
computer and two hard drives.
20
 
The police then sought a warrant, representing that drug dealers often 
keep “trophy photos” of large quantities of drugs or cash to celebrate 
successful transactions.
21
  The judge issued a warrant to search the motor 
home for “evidence to show the transportation and delivery of controlled 
substances,” including “computer records” and “pay-owe sheets, address 
books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms and monies.”22  The warrant imposed no 
special limits on the computer searches. 
An investigator copied all three drives using a program that permitted 
the officer to view the files as they were copied.
23
  The officer saw an image 
of “child sexual exploitation,” turned off the view function, and sought 
another warrant authorizing a search of the drives for child pornography.
24
  




Burgess moved to suppress, arguing that the initial warrant was 
general and so the plain-view discovery of the child pornography was fruit 
of the poisonous tree.
26
  The government defended the warrant as 
adequately particularized and also claimed that, even if the warrant were 
void, the police could search the computer drives under the vehicle 
exception because the drives were analogous to containers that had been 
found in a vehicle.
27
  The district court accepted both government 
 
17 United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1083. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1083–84. 
22 Id. at 1083. 









  On appeal the Tenth Circuit upheld the initial warrant and 
declined to rule on the defendant’s argument that the vehicle search 
exception should not extend to digital evidence.
29
 
By its literal terms the warrant authorized the police to search all the 
suspect’s computer files for anything at all.30  The supporting affidavit 
indicated that the police were looking for photographic evidence of drug 
dealing, although the warrant did not say this.
31
  The Burgess court rescued 
the warrant by imputing the affidavit’s mention of “trophy photos” to the 
warrant.
32
  On the authority of this generic warrant, even as narrowed by 
construction, the police undertook the process of copying and viewing all 
the files on the three drives.
33
 
The court’s evasive passage rejecting the defendant’s particularity 
argument betrayed considerable ambivalence: While “[o]fficers must be 
clear as to what it is they are seeking on the computer and conduct the 
search in a way that avoids searching files of types not identified in the 
warrant,”34 “a computer search may be as extensive as reasonably required 
to locate the items described in the warrant”35 based on probable cause.  
And “[t]his Court has never required warrants to contain a particularized 
computer search strategy.”36  Recognizing with regret the global search 
power conferred on police by a warrant authorizing a search of computer 
files, the Tenth Circuit weighed the evils and concluded that “it is folly for a 
search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the search and a 
warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search 
objectives.”37  “[I]n the end, there may be no practical substitute for actually 
looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the documents 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1090 (“In spite of clear language in Acevedo, one might speculate whether the 
Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash drives or even cell phones as 
it has a briefcase or give those types of devices preferred status because of their unique 
ability to hold vast amounts of diverse personal information.  Interesting as the issue may be, 
we need not now resolve it because the search of Burgess’ hard drives was authorized by a 
warrant.”). 
30 Id. at 1094. 
31 Id. at 1091–92. 
32 Id. at 1091 (citation omitted). 
33 Id. at 1091–92. 
34 Id. at 1092 (quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
35 Id. (quoting United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
36 Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
37 Id. at 1094. 
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contained within those folders, and that is true whether the search is of 
computer files or physical files.  It is particularly true with image files.”38 
The Ninth Circuit has weighed the evils rather differently.  In United 
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, the en banc court’s opinion upheld 
two lower court rulings ordering the government to return computer records 
seized in violation of warrants that did impose limits on the search of 
computer files.
39
  Neither Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 nor any 
Supreme Court case interpreting the Fourth Amendment requires special 
procedures for computer searches.
40
  The issue was whether, where district 
courts included safeguards in the search warrants, plaintiffs were entitled to 




The court’s per curiam opinion did not expressly say that a warrant 
that failed to include special particularity guarantees, like the one in 
Burgess, would be unconstitutional, but that message was at least arguably 
implied.  Chief Judge Kozinski, joined by four other judges, went further in 
a concurring opinion.  In the interests of guiding lower courts, prosecutors, 
and agents, the concurring opinion described a constitutional “safe harbor” 
for warrants to search computer files.  The (rather strongly) suggested 
warrant structure is as follows: 
1. Magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain 
view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 
2. Segregation and redaction of electronic data must be done either by specialized 
personnel or an independent third party.  If the segregation is to be done by 
government computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant 
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information 
as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. 
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the 
information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be 
examined by the case agents. 
 
38 Id.  If image files are not Fourth Amendment “papers,” a point on which I here express 
no view, they would just be “effects” and the Burgess holding would be unproblematic from 
a historical perspective. 
39 621 F.3d 1162, 1167–75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
40 The majority and the concurrence rely on dicta in United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 
591 (9th Cir. 1982), directing magistrates to regulate and monitor large-scale seizures of 
paper documents. 
41 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1165–66. 
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5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return 
non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done 
so and what it has kept.
42
 
The suggested approach is structurally similar to the special rules for digital 
searches adopted in the United Kingdom.
43
 
Chief Judge Kozinski supported the recommended guidelines by 
citations suggesting they were implicit in the majority opinion.  Judge Bea, 
however, characterized Judge Kozinksi’s opinion as “advisory,”44 while 
Judge Callahan, joined by Judge Ikuta, agreed that the concurrence was 
advisory but also criticized the suggested guidelines.
45
  Judge Callahan 
made the forceful points that the concurrence would effectively eliminate 
 
42 Id. at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
43 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, c. 60 § 8 (U.K.), abrogated the 
common law prohibition of warrants for papers insofar as PACE authorizes warrants to enter 
private premises to search for “material” that may be evidence or have substantial value in 
the investigation.  POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 CODE B: CODE OF PRACTICE 
FOR SEARCHES OF PREMISES BY POLICE OFFICERS AND THE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY FOUND BY 
POLICE OFFICERS ON PERSONS OR PREMISES, § 7.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/operational-policing/pace-codes/pace-
code-b-2011?view=Binary.  PACE provides that: 
Subject to paragraph 7.2, an officer who is searching any person or premises under any statutory 
power or with the consent of the occupier may seize anything: 
(a) covered by a warrant 
(b) the officer has reasonable grounds for believing is evidence of an offence or has been 
obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence but only if seizure is necessary 
to prevent the items being concealed, lost, disposed of, altered, damaged, destroyed or 
tampered with 
(c) covered by the powers in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Part 2 allowing an 
officer to seize property from persons or premises and retain it for sifting or examination 
elsewhere. 
Id. 
Code B’s §§ 7.5–7.7 caution that police may seize documents or computer files only 
when it is impracticable to rely on printouts or photocopies, and that a resort to the “seize 
and sift” provisions of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is only appropriate if it is 
essential and police do not remove any more material than necessary.  Id.  The removal of 
large volumes of material, much of which may not ultimately be retainable, may have 
serious implications for the owners, particularly when they are involved in business or 
activities such as journalism or the provision of medical services.  Id.  Officers must 
carefully consider if removing copies or images of relevant material or data would be a 
satisfactory alternative to removing originals.  Id.  When originals are taken, officers must be 
prepared to facilitate the provision of copies or images for the owners when reasonably 
practicable.  Id. 
44 Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1182 (Bea, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
45 Id. at 1183 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the plain-view doctrine in computer searches and that it offered “no legal 
authority for its proposal requiring the segregation of computer data by 
specialized personnel or an independent third party.”46 
In sum, Burgess states the orthodox view of searches of computers and 
other electronics, which equates digital storage devices with file cabinets.
47
  
Despite the dominance of rote application of the physical rules to the digital 
sphere, there is unquiet among judges.  Comprehensive Drug Testing is one 
example.  The apologetic tone in Burgess, itself retreating from the Tenth 
Circuit’s former special regard for digital evidence, is another. 
B. SEARCHES OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE INCIDENT TO LAWFUL 
ARREST 
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld a “thorough” 
“search of respondent’s person” because Robinson had been lawfully 
arrested.
49
  No case-specific reason for a search, such as specific grounds to 
believe the suspect is carrying weapons or contraband, is required.
50
  In 
Robinson the Court rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress heroin 
found inside a crumpled cigarette pack located in Robinson’s pocket.  The 
lower courts have applied the automatic right to search items found on the 
person arrested to such personal items as wallets and purses.
51
 
A cell phone seems very similar to other personal effects.  Many 
suspects are arrested with their phones literally on their persons, inside a 
pocket or a purse.  Professor Gershowitz estimates that in recent years 
police have made “thousands” of searches of cell phones incident to 
arrests.
52
  The leading case, United States v. Finley,
53
 simply equated 
 
46 Id. at 1184. 
47 See United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that “the 
majority of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol and, instead, 
have employed the Fourth Amendment’s bedrock principle of reasonableness on a case-by-
case basis”) (footnote omitted); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of 
Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 197–202 
(2005).  Indeed, as Clancy points out, the then-leading case recommending special 
computer-search protocols was the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Carey, 172 
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), which Burgess distinguished as “fact intense.”  United States v. 
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009). 
49 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
50 Id. at 235 (holding “that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the 
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is 
also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”). 
51 3 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.3; see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 
778 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding search of wallet and address book); People v. Harris, 164 
Cal. Rptr. 296, 301–03 (Ct. App. 1980) (upholding search of purse and wallet found therein). 
52 Adam M. Gershowitz, Can Police Search Your Cell Phone, and Even Break Your 
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Finley’s cell phone with Robinson’s cigarette pack.54  Yet in Finley the 
agents read the address book and text messages stored in Finley’s phone,55 
an intrusion that seems dramatically more intrusive than rummaging 
through a cigarette pack. 
Although Finley is still generally followed,
56
 some judicial skepticism 
is emerging.  In State v. Smith, the police seized Smith’s cell phone from his 
person at the time of arrest and later searched the address book and text 
messages.
57
  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the analogy to “containers,” 
reasoning that a container is one object capable of holding another object.
58
  
Repositories of intangible information, like Smith’s phone, were different.59  
The Smith court then concluded that Smith had a higher expectation of 
privacy in his phone than in ordinary effects, and that while the warrantless 
seizure of the phone at the time of arrest was reasonable, the subsequent 
warrantless search of its contents was not.
60
 
Eventually the Supreme Court will decide cases in which the 
government relied on traditional, rolodex-era warrants to search computer 
records, and defense counsel argue that digital searches without novel 
safeguards along the lines suggested by Chief Judge Kozinski are 
“unreasonable.”  Likewise the high Court is likely to decide cases in which 
the government relies on the search-incident-to-arrest exception to justify 
searches of cell phones, tablets, flash drives, and notebook computers 
without warrants or probable cause.  The Court’s own cases regarding 
physical evidence are relatively recent but disturbingly incongruent with the 
lived experience of modern technology. 
 
Password, During an Arrest?, 35 CHAMPION 16, 17 (2011) (“Although it is impossible to 
know how many cell phone searches have been conducted incident to arrest over the last few 
years, the number is likely in the thousands.”) (footnote omitted). 
53 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
54 See id. at 259–60 (“Police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or 
instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional 
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for 
use at trial.”) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233–34). 
55 Finley, 477 F.3d at 254. 
56 See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2 (observing that “on the limited occasions when the 
issue has been reached, courts have also rather consistently found ‘warrantless searches of 
cell phones to fall squarely within the search-incident-to-arrest exception,’ so that call 
records and text messages found in such a search are thereby admissible in evidence”) 
(footnote omitted). 
57 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2011). 
58 Id. at 953–54. 
59 Id. at 955. 
60 Id. 
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When these cases arise, will the Court be able to find some principled 
ground for recognizing the special privacy concerns raised by dense 
concentrations of highly personal information found in common handheld 
devices?  History suggests that certain “effects”—private “papers”—were 
indeed originally understood to deserve more constitutional protection than 
others.  If that is so, and if a cogent analogy can be drawn between 
eighteenth-century “papers” and modern digital storage devices, there may 
be neglected doctrinal opportunities for responding to the technology crisis 
in Fourth Amendment law. 
So let us go to the past and, just perhaps, back to the future. 
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER LIBELS, GENERAL WARRANTS, AND THE 
SEIZURE OF PAPERS, 1763–1766 
The Fourth Amendment is generally seen as a response to two protests 
against particular abuses, the first against Writs of Assistance in the 
colonies in 1761–1762 and the second against general warrants in England 
in 1764–1765.  The inspiration for singling out “papers” in the Fourth 
Amendment lies in this later controversy.  John Adams’s report of Otis’s 
famous argument against the Writs of Assistance makes no special mention 
of papers.
61
  This is not surprising because the writs did not authorize 
seizure of papers, only of undutied goods.
62
  The English courts had not yet 
prohibited general warrants to search for and seize libels. 
But in 1762 and 1763, the King’s messengers executed general 
warrants to seize the authors and printers of seditious libels.  They were 
sued successfully in the courts, which distinctly condemned general 
warrants and warrants for papers.  Leading Whig commentators and 
resolutions of the House of Commons condemned the distinct but related 
evils of general warrants and warrants for papers.  American Patriots paid 
close attention to this political drama. 
A. THE NORTH BRITON NO. 45 
George III became King of England in 1760.  His chief minister was a 
Scot, the Earl of Bute.  It was an age of weekly “newspapers” (pamphlets, 
really), exemplified by such items as The Tattler and The Rambler.  
Supporters of the government—the Tories—ran a paper called The Briton.  
 
61 See JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 519–20 (1865).  Otis lost his case, see, 
e.g., M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 391–92 (1978), but Otis’s argument 
inspired Adams and, presumably, others.  Very few writs were ever actually issued by 
colonial courts. 
62 See, e.g., WILLIAM MACDONALD, DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY 1606–1898, at 108 (1908) (“THEREFORE we strictly Injoin & Command you . . . 
to inspect & oversee & search for the said goods wares & merchandize.”). 
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John Wilkes, a flamboyant Member of Parliament and a leading Whig, 
published a weekly paper called the North Briton.  The North Briton’s title 
was itself a dig at Bute’s Scottish roots, but Wilkes went further—much 
further—in the famous issue No. 45. 
In popular parlance, “the 45” referred to the last major revolt by 
supporters of the exiled House of Stuart (called “Jacobites” because James 
Francis Edward Stuart was then the heir to that house).  The 1745 uprising 
involved a plan to join Jacobite forces from the continent with allies in 
Scotland.  Wilkes was linking, with no great subtlety, the King’s favorite 
minister with those who had plotted to restore the Stuart monarchy, widely 
unpopular on account of its political oppressiveness and its Catholic 
sympathies. 
No. 45 was a scurrilous attack on the King’s speech opening the latest 
session of Parliament, a speech defending the Treaty of Paris, which ended 
the Seven Years’ War.  Wilkes took the line that the British had won the 
war but lost the conference, the whole of Canada being regarded as 
insufficient booty.  The shots at Bute came very close to the King: “In vain 
will such a minister, or the foul dregs of his power, the tools of corruption 
and despotism, preach up in the speech that spirit of concord, and that 
obedience to the laws, which is essential to good order.”63  His Majesty was 
incensed and Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, wrote out a general 
warrant to “seize and arrest” everyone connected with No. 45 “together 
with their papers” (the Halifax warrant).64  Wilkes was arrested on April 30, 
1763, and all his papers carried off;
65
 forty-nine others were arrested.
66
 
His supporters having sued out a writ of habeas corpus, Wilkes was 
brought to the bar of the Court of Common Pleas on May 3.  In the speech 
he is said to have given there, Wilkes remarked on his injuries and vowed 
 
63 JOHN WILKES, THE NORTH BRITON, NO. 45, Apr. 23, 1763, reprinted in JOHN WILKES 
AN AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JOHN WILKES 8, 10 (1763) 
[hereinafter AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT]. 
64 The warrant, “directed to” Nathan Carrington, John Money, James Watson, and Robert 
Blackmore, “Four of his majesty’s messengers in ordinary” states: 
THESE are in his Majesty’s Name to authorize and require you (taking a Constable to your 
assistance) to make strict and diligent search for the Authors, Printers, and Publishers of a 
seditious and treasonable Paper, intitled, The North Briton, Number XLV . . . and them or any of 
them having found to apprehend and seize together with their papers and to bring in safe custody 
before me to be examined concerning the premises and further dealt with according to law[.] 
AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT, supra note 63, at 12–13. 
65 Id. at 13. 
66 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 602–1791, at 440 (2009). 
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revenge in the courts: 
The particular cruelties of my treatment, worse than if I had been a Scots Rebel, this 
court will hear, and I dare say, from your justice, in due time redress. . . .  My papers 
have been seized, perhaps with a hope the better to deprive me of that proof of their 
meanness, and corrupt prodigality, which it may possibly, in a proper place, be yet in 
my power to give.
67
 
Chief Justice Pratt of the Court of Common Pleas (later Lord Camden) 
ordered Wilkes released because libel was not a breach of the peace and 




B. GENERAL WARRANTS AND THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS: THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS TEMPORIZES 
Wilkes, after recovering from a wound suffered in a duel, then fled to 
France and was expelled from the Commons on January 19, 1764.
69
  On 
February 14, his supporters introduced a resolution: “That a General 
Warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers, and publishers 
of a seditious libel, together with their papers, is not warranted by law.”70  A 
variety of amendments, apparently intended to garner as many votes as 
possible, resulted in this wording: 
That a General Warrant for apprehending and seizing the authors, printers, and 
publishers, of a seditious and treasonable libel, together with their papers, is not 
warranted by law; although such warrant hath been issued according to the usage of 
office; and hath been frequently produced to, and, so far as appears to this House, the 
validity thereof hath never been debated in the court of King’s-bench; but the parties 
thereupon have been frequently bailed by the said court.
71
 
There was intense debate on the measure, and many supporters of the 
government (now led by Grenville rather than Bute) were in favor of the 
motion.  Confronted with his own practice of issuing general warrants when 
he served as prime minister, the Whig William Pitt (the elder) claimed to 
have issued them, knowing them to be illegal, as an act of selfless 
disobedience in wartime emergency.
72
  The house narrowly voted (232 to 
 
67 AUTHENTICK ACCOUNT, supra note 63, at 19. 
68 Id. at 25. 
69 See 15 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
YEAR 1803, at 1393–94 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY 
HISTORY].  Expulsion followed the disclosure of Wilkes’s coauthorship of An Essay on 
Woman, an obscene parody of Pope’s Essay on Man.  See, e.g., JOHN STEVEN WATSON & 
JOHN CLARK, THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, 1760–1815, at 101 (1960). 
70 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 1399. 
71 Id. at 1401. 
72 See, e.g., 5 LORD MAHON, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE PEACE OF UTRECHT TO THE 
PEACE OF VERSAILLES 153–54 (1853). 
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218) to put off debate on the resolution for four months.
73
 
C. THE TORT SUITS AGAINST THE KING’S MESSENGERS AND 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
Meanwhile Wilkes and others molested on the authority of the Halifax 
warrant were pressing tort suits against the executing officers and Halifax 
himself.
74
  In December 1863, Pratt upheld a jury verdict for Wilkes against 
Wood, one of the officers who executed the Halifax warrant, holding the 
warrant illegal and void.
75
  Pratt refused to receive Wood’s bill of 
exceptions as untimely, but when the King’s Bench heard the issue in 




One of Wilkes’s associates was John Entick, the author of another 
antigovernment periodical, The Monitor, or British Freeholder.  In 
November 1762, before the appearance of the fateful North Briton No. 45, 
Entick’s house was raided by officers executing another warrant issued by 
Halifax.  Encouraged by the success Wilkes and others were enjoying in the 
courts, Entick sued Nathan Carrington and the other officers who had 
ransacked his home. 
The defendants pleaded two justifications for the alleged trespass.  
First, they claimed that Halifax had the status, and therefore the immunity, 
of a justice of the peace.  That immunity, they argued, should extend to the 
officers.  Second, they claimed that the warrant made forcible entry of 
private premises legal.  The defendants’ pleadings described the warrant as 
follows: 
[T]he earl did in the King’s name authorize and require the defendants, taking a 
constable to their assistance, to make strict and diligent search for the plaintiff, 
mentioned in the said warrant to be the author, or one concerned in the writing of 
several weekly very seditious papers, intitled, The Monitor or British Freeholder, No. 
357, 358, 360, 373, 376, and 380, London, printed for J. Wilson and J. Fell in 
Paternoster Row, containing gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon His 
 
73 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 1401. 
74 Together with party sentiment, the pending litigation helps to explain the failure of the 
resolution condemning general warrants even though general warrants seemed to have 
received no defense in the Commons.  See 2 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 129 (Francis Holland ed., new ed. 1912). 
75 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 1168 (C.P.). 
76 (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088, 19 How. St. Tr. 1002, 1027 (K.B.).  After Lord 
Mansfield, Justice Wilmot, Justice Yates, and Justice Aston agreed that the warrant was 
illegal, the case was reargued and the verdict upheld because the defendants had not acted in 
accordance with the warrant.  See 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088–89. 
2013] DEAREST PROPERTY 65 
Majesty’s Government, and upon both Houses of Parliament, and him the plaintiff 
having found, to seize and apprehend and bring together with his books and papers in 
safe custody, before the Earl of Halifax to be examined concerning the premises, and 
further dealt with according to law . . . .
77
 
Pratt’s famous opinion rejected both defenses, finding that the 




There were two published reports of Entick v. Carrington.  Serjeant 
Wilson’s reports appeared in 1770.79  In 1780, Francis Hargrave published a 
new edition of Howell’s State Trials, in ten volumes, followed by a 
supplemental eleventh volume in 1781.
80
  Professor Davies has argued that 
the American Founders would only have known Wilson’s report, while 
Boyd cites only to the State Trials report.
81
  Antebellum American 
references to Entick typically cite to Wilson’s report rather than Hargrave’s.  
There is, however, some evidence indicating that the State Trials edition 
 
77 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808, 2 Wils. 275, 275–76, 19 How. St. 
Tr. 1029 (K.B.). 
78 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1062, 1074.  
79 Entick appears in 2 Wils. 275. 
80 See JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 66–67 (Boston, Soule & Bugbee, 4th 
rev. ed. 1882).  The earliest references to the State Trials version cite “11 St. Tr. 313.”  See 
Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (per curiam).  Early in the nineteenth 
century, William Cobbett brought out a new version of the State Trials in thirty-four 
volumes, edited initially by Thomas Bayley Howell and subsequently by his son, Thomas 
Jones Howell.  See WALLACE, supra, at 67–68.  The Cobbett–Howell report is taken from 
Hargrave, as it begins with a note by Hargrave about why the text differs from Wilson’s.  
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029.  Hargrave took the arguments of counsel straight from 
Wilson, but “instead of his short note of the Judgement [sic] of the Court, the Editor 
[Hargrave] has the pleasing satisfaction to present to the reader the Judgment itself at length, 
as delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from written notes.”  Id.  
According to Hargrave, Pratt’s original: 
[W]as not deemed worthy of preservation by its author, but was actually committed to the 
flames.  Fortunately, the Editor remembered to have formerly seen a copy of the Judgment in the 
hands of a friend; and upon application to him, it was immediately obtained, with liberty to the 
Editor to make use of it at his discretion. 
Id.  After the appearance of the Cobbett–Howell volumes, the standard citation became “19 
How. St. Tr. 1029.” 
81 See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-
Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 
118 (2010) (“[B]ecause it is unlikely that the later report would have been imported in 
significant numbers during the remainder of the framing era, it seems highly doubtful 
Americans would have become familiar with Camden’s notion that a search warrant for 
papers was inherently illegal even by the time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment in 
1789.”). 
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was circulating in America as well as in England.
82
 
Although Wilson’s report is denser, both reports of Entick identify four 
distinct obnoxious features of the warrant to seize papers.  First, not only 
was it general with respect to the premises to be entered forcibly in search 
of the suspected papers, but also it was totally indiscriminate about the 
papers to be seized and carried away.
83
  Second, it expropriated.  The 
plaintiff’s papers were not merely read by government agents, but the 
plaintiff himself was deprived of their use.
84
  Third, the execution of the 
warrant was unregulated.  The warrant did not require the presence of the 
owner or any neutral witness, an inventory, or a process for disputing the 
seizure and recovering the papers.
85
  Finally, the seizure of papers was 
inquisitorial.  Unlike the seizure of other goods, the seizure of papers 
reveals the private workings of a person’s mind to government agents 
 
82 See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 
45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 41 n.260 (2009–2010) (“Moreover, the set of books containing the 
longer version (Hargrave’s A Complete Collection of State-Trials and Proceedings for High-
Treason, and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours (known as State Trials, 4th edition 
(1781))[)] was a fixture of late-eighteenth-century law libraries.  Over a hundred of these 
sets survive in the rare book collections of American libraries today, and several libraries 
(e.g., Yale’s and Harvard’s) hold more than one complete set.  The notion that all of these 
book sets, published in 1781, crossed the Atlantic only after the Fourth Amendment was 
proposed and ratified (between September 1787 and December 1791) seems highly 
unlikely.”). 
83 See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291 (comparing Entick to Wilkes, in which “we were told by one 
of these messengers that he was obliged by his oath to sweep away all papers whatsoever; if 
this is law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country”); 
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064 (“[T]he house must be searched; the lock and doors of every 
room, box or trunk must be broken open; all the papers and books without exception . . . 
must be seized and carried away . . . .”); id. at 1065 (“Nor is there pretence to say, that the 
word ‘papers’ here mentioned ought in point of law to be restrained to the libellous papers 
only.  The word is general, and there is nothing in the warrant to confine it . . . .”). 
84 See Entick, 2 Wils. at 292 (“[T]his is the first instance of an attempt to prove a modern 
practice . . . to make and execute warrants to enter a man’s house, search for and take away 
all his books and papers in the first instance, to be law, which is not to be found in our 
books.”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“[T]he party’s own property is seized before and 
without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his innocence is 
cleared by acquittal.”). 
85 See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291 (“[I]t was left to the discretion of these defendants to 
execute the warrant in the absence or presence of the plaintiff, when he might have no 
witness present to see what they did; for they were to seize all papers, bank bills, or any 
other valuable papers they might take away if there so disposed; there might be nobody to 
detect them . . . .”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1065 (“[T]he whole transaction is so guarded 
against discovery, that if the offer should be disposed to carry off a bank-bill, he may do it 
with impunity, since there is no man capable of proving the taker or the thing taken.”). 
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seeking a criminal conviction.
86
 
Professor Sklansky argues that American hostility to the inquisitorial 
system in the original understandings of 1791, and especially 1868, has 
been exaggerated.
87
  These points are well-taken and perhaps even 
understated; the Framers retained the most inquisitorial English procedure, 
examination following arrest.
88
  Yet the evidence is unequivocal that Whig 
jurists condemned the seizure of papers as inquisitorial.  For example, 
Serjeant Glynn argued in Entick that: 
[N]o power can lawfully break into a man’s house and study to search for evidence 
against him; this would be worse than the Spanish inquisition; for ransacking a man’s 
secret drawers and boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to 
come at his secret thoughts.
89
 
If the vice in the Halifax warrant in Entick was not the authorization of 
seizing papers, what was it?  The warrant might not pass modern standards 
of Fourth Amendment particularity, but it was far more specific than the 
one issued in the Wilkes case.
90
  Hargrave gave titles to the cases in the 
State Trials reports.  He called Wilkes v. Wood “the Case of General 
Warrants” and Entick v. Carrington “the case of Seizure of Papers.”  These 
were the names—one might suppose—they already had among lawyers. 
Entick’s respect for papers went so far as to question whether libels 
themselves could be seized.  Pratt admitted that the practice had been to 
seize libels, but dated the practice only to an advisory opinion delivered by 
 
86 See Entick, 2 Wils. at 291–92 (upholding the warrant “would destroy all the comforts 
of society; for papers are often the dearest property a man can have”); id. at 292 (“The law 
never forces evidence from the party in whose power it is; when an adversary has got your 
deeds, there is no lawful way of getting them again but by an action.  Our law is wise and 
merciful, and supposes every man accused to be innocent before he is tried by peers . . . .”) 
(internal citation omitted); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“Papers are the owner’s goods 
and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they 
will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of 
a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those 
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that 
respect.”). 
87 David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1670–77 
(2009). 
88 See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1125 (1994) (describing 
persistence of the examination procedure in Founding-era America). 
89 2 Wils. at 283;  see also infra text accompanying note 110. 
90 See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 
869, 881 (1985) (“[T]he warrant expressly named Entick” and this “distinguished it from the 
general warrants at issue in the other decisions.  Indeed, not once do either the lengthy 
arguments of counsel or the opinions refer to the Entick warrant as a general warrant.”). 




  If the seizure of libels was lawful, then they were proper objects 
of searches and “half the kingdom would be guilty in the case of a favourite 
libel, if libels may be searched for and seized by whomsoever and 
wheresoever the secretary of state thinks fit.”92  Given the magnitude of the 
pool into which the criminal documents were commingled, tolerating libel 
might be a lesser evil than tolerating the search powers necessary to ferret 
out the libels. 
Pratt, however, left the question open, saying “if” private possession of 
a libel is crime, “as many cases say,” disturbing search powers follow.93  In 
the fuller report he says, “If libels may be seized, it ought to be laid down 
with precision, when, where, upon what charge, against whom, by what 
magistrate, and in what stage of the prosecution.”94  Although it seems that 
libels were contraband that had no legal value,
95
 I have been unable to find 
concrete post-Entick examples of seizing stocks of offending pamphlets.  In 
1819 Parliament adopted a Libel Act as part of the notorious Six Acts, a 
crackdown on radicalism.  Section 1 of the Act authorized the seizure of 
copies of a libel following the conviction of the author or publisher.
96
  From 
the general purpose of the Six Acts, I suppose the Libel Act broadened prior 
seizure powers, but this is only conjecture. 
The reported opinions were only one source of public information 
about the controversy over the seizure of papers.  Before Wilson’s reports 
were published in 1770, the parliamentary debate about general warrants in 
1764 set off a pamphlet war between Whigs and Tories.  There are at least 
passing references to the special evil of seizing papers in every Whig tract I 
have seen, and a full exposition of the theory later expressed in Boyd, 
including the notion that use of papers at trial is compelled self-
incrimination, in the most prominent pamphlet of them all. 
 
91 On the opinion of the twelve judges referred to in Entick, see Phillip Hamburger, The 
Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
661, 686 (1985). 
92 Entick, 2 Wils. at 292. 
93 Id. 
94 19 How. St. Tr. at 1072. 
95 See Fores v. Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654, 654–55 (noting that plaintiff sold 
prints to defendant and sued for payment and Justice Lawrence ruled that “the plaintiff may 
recover; but I cannot permit him to do so for such whose tendency is immoral or obscene; 
nor for such as are libels on individuals, and for which the plaintiff might have been 
rendered criminally answerable for a libel”). 
96 1819, 60 Geo. 3, c. 8, § 1 (U.K.), reprinted in 3 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 255–56 (1820).  
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D. THE PAMPHLET WAR OF ’64 
After the brouhaha in the Commons in February 1764, the Tories 
undertook a propaganda campaign to vindicate the use of general warrants 
in libel cases.  Dr. Johnson, with characteristic pungency, declared that 
general warrants were “a matter about which the people cared so very little, 
that were a man to be sent over Britain to offer them an exemption from it 
at a halfpenny a piece, very few would purchase it.”97  The Whigs had a 
propaganda machine of their own and put it in gear.
98
 
The Whigs’ first salvo following the equivocation in the Commons 
was A Defence of the Minority in the House of Commons, on the Question 
Relating to General Warrants, written by Charles Townshend but printed 
without attribution by John Almon in 1764.
99
  The Defence of the Minority 
focused primarily on general warrants, but also asked rhetorically what law 
then in force could deter Halifax from issuing another general warrant by 
which his messengers might enter another author’s “House abruptly, 
alarming His family, keeping Him in close Custody; tumbling His most 
secret and confidential Papers and Deeds carelessly into a Sack, as in the 
former Instances, and trusting them to the Hand of a common and 
unresponsible Person, without Schedule or Security for recovery of 
them?”100 
Townshend’s pamphlet inspired a rebuttal by Charles Lloyd, again 
printed without attribution.
101
  This Defence of the Majority is said to have 
“thoroughly crushed its rival.”102  There promptly appeared a surrebuttal, 
printed again by Almon and presumably authored again by Townshend.
103
  
This Reply emphasizes the dangers of seizing papers: “What private 
Gentleman can think his Property or Reputation safe, if the Title Deeds, by 
which he holds the one may be taken away, and every Secret of his Life be 
exposed to hurt the other?”104 
 
97 See ROBERT R. REA, THE ENGLISH PRESS IN POLITICS 1760–1774, at 107 (1963). 
98 For an extensive survey of the controversy in England, see Schnapper, supra note 90, 
at 884–913. 
99 See id. at 897. 
100 CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE DEFENCE OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
ON THE QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRNTS 35–36 (London, J. Almon 1764). 
101 CHARLES LLOYD, A DEFENCE OF THE MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE 
QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRANTS, IN ANSWER TO THE DEFENCE OF THE MINORITY 
(London, J. Wilkie, 2d ed. 1764).  I am working with the second edition, which has an 
addendum but does not appear to have been revised. 
102 REA, supra note 97, at 108. 
103 SIR WILLIAM MEREDITH, A REPLY TO THE DEFENCE OF THE MAJORITY, ON THE 
QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL WARRANTS (London, J. Almon 1764). 
104 Id. at 19. 
70 DONALD A. DRIPPS [Vol. 103 
 
The Reply was soon reinforced by a polemicist who “deserves to be 
ranked among . . . the great Georgian pamphleteers.”105  The true identity of 
the author (or authors) known as “Candor” and “Father of Candor” is still a 
matter of conjecture.
106
  But it is generally agreed that the two pamphlets, A 
Letter from Candor to the Public Advertiser
107
 and A Letter Concerning 
Libels, Warrants, the Seizure of Papers, and Sureties for the Peace of 
Behaviour,
108
 swept the field.
109
 
Candor discusses private papers in the Letter to the Public Advertiser.  
After condemning the Wilkes warrant for generality, Candor says: 
[A]ny man is at liberty to think, and to put what thoughts he pleases upon paper, 
provided he does not publish them.  In the case, therefore, of a Libel, this inquisitorial 
power of ransacking papers will not be endured.  It would lead to the seizing of a man 
and his papers for a libel, against whom there was no proof, merely slight suspicion, 
under a hope that, among the private papers of his bureau, some proof might be found 
which would answer the end.  It is a fishing for evidence, to the disquiet of all men, 
and to the violation of every private right; and is the most odious and infamous act, of 
the worst sort of inquisitions, by the worst sort of men, in the most enslaved counties: 




Candor clearly described the seizure of papers as an evil distinct from 
general warrants, and clearly linked it to the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
A still clearer exposition of the theory later adopted by Boyd appears 
in Father of Candor’s A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, the Seizure of 
Papers, and Sureties for the Peace of Behavior.  The very title distinguishes 
the issue of general warrants from the issue of seizing papers.  For a 
measured writer, Father of Candor expressed an extreme degree of 
 
105 REA, supra note 97, at 110. 
106 See, e.g., ANNABEL PATTERSON, NOBODY’S PERFECT: A NEW WHIG INTERPRETATION 
OF HISTORY 44–45 (2002) (attributing authorship to Almon in collaboration with Pratt); 
DEBORAH D. ROBERTS, BOOKSELLER AS ROGUE: JOHN ALMON AND THE POLITICS OF 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PUBLISHING 23 (1986) (authorship variously attributed to Pratt, John 
Dunning, or the two collaborating). 
107 CANDOR, A LETTER FROM CANDOR TO THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London, J. Almon 
1764). 
108 FATHER OF CANDOR, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF 
PAPERS, AND SURETIES FOR THE PEACE OF BEHAVIOUR (London, J. Almon, 5th ed. 1765) 
(1764). 
109 See, e.g., 10 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE § 17 
(1921), available at http://www.bartleby.com/220/1717.html (“This masterly pamphlet 
attracted general admiration, and its cool and lucid reasoning, varied by an occasional ironic 
humour, did not meet with any reply.”). 
110 CANDOR, supra note 107, at 30–31. 
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emotional antipathy to prying into private papers: 
What then, can be more excruciating torture, than to have the lowest of mankind, such 
fellows as Mooney, Watson, and the rest of them, enter suddenly into his house, and 
forcibly carry away his scrutores, with all his papers of every kind, under a pretence 
of law, because the Attorney-general had, ex officio, filed an information against the 
author, printer and publisher of some pamphlet or weekly paper, and somebody had 




The seizure of papers was an “absolute illegality” and an “abominable 
outrage,”112 and the use of seized papers at a criminal trial “would be 
making a man give evidence against and accuse himself, with a 
vengeance.”113 
The libel itself might be seized, but no other documents, because only 
the libel was contraband: 
It must either be sworn that I have certain stolen goods, or such a particular thing that 
is criminal in itself, in my custody, before any magistrate is authorized to grant a 
warrant to any man to enter my house and seize it.  Nay further, if a positive oath be 
made, and such a particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon the paper 
or thing sworn to and specified, and in the presence of the owner or of somebody 
intrusted by him, with the custody of it.
114
 
Father of Candor was well-known in America.
115
  On his website, 
Roger Roots claims to have found more than 100 copies of Father of 
Candor’s Letter Concerning Libels in American libraries, some, apparently, 
once owned by Rufus King and Benjamin Franklin.
116
 
The most popular tract to emerge from the Wilkes affair was 
Britannia’s Intercession for the Deliverance of John Wilkes, a celebration 
of Wilkes and liberty in mock-biblical rhetoric.
117
  Even this rather lowbrow 
production made special mention of papers: “And they looked into his 
dwelling, and searched for his papers, and all secret workings, and they 
took them every one.”118 
 
111 FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 54. 
112 Id. at 54. 
113 Id. at 55–56. 
114 Id. at 58. 
115 See LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS 157 (1995) (Americans found a lot of 
thunder “in Pitt, Camden, Wilkes, and in ‘Father of Candor,’ all of whom they knew well”). 
116 Father of Candor’s “Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants [etc.][”], ROGER ROOTS, 
available at http://rogerroots.org/contactus.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
117 BRITANNIA’S INTERCESSION FOR THE DELIVERANCE OF JOHN WILKES, ESQ. FROM 
PERSECUTION AND BANISHMENT TO WHICH IS ADDED A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
SERMON AND A DEDICATION TO L*** B*** (7th ed. London 1769). 
118 Id. at 7. 
72 DONALD A. DRIPPS [Vol. 103 
 
E. ENDGAME IN PARLIAMENT 
In 1766 Bute’s successor, Grenville, was in turn replaced by the 
Marquess of Rockingham.
119
  By then, Leach had declared general warrants 
for libels illegal, and Entick had ruled the seizure of papers illegal.  
“Accordingly, resolutions were now agreed to, condemning general 
warrants, whether for the seizure of persons or papers, as illegal . . . .”120  
The resolutions were distinct.  The actual wording of the general warrants 
resolution was not confined to libel, while the second resolution condemned 
seizing the papers “of the author, printer, or publisher, of a libel, or the 
supposed author, printer, or publisher of a libel.”121  Looking back on the 
Rockingham administration, which lasted just over a year, Edmund Burke 
celebrated its various accomplishments.
122
  The list includes these two 
consecutive items: 
The personal liberty of the subject was confirmed, by the resolution against general 
warrants. 
The lawful secrets of business and friendship were rendered inviolable, by the 
resolution for condemning the seizure of papers.
123
 
From the speech Wilkes gave in court after his arrest, to the separate 
opinions in Entick and Wilkes, to the Father of Candor pamphlets, to the 
resolutions of the House, warrants for papers and general warrants were 
seen as related, but distinct, abuses. 
III. THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS IN AMERICA FROM THE ENGLISH 
CONTROVERSY THROUGH THE FOUNDING ERA 
A. AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 
We have long known that the tribulations of Wilkes were followed 
closely in the colonies.  We also have at least some direct evidence that 
American Whigs followed the Entick litigation and understood the seizure 
of papers as a distinct abuse.  Eric Schnapper previously brought to light a 
report of the Wilkes verdict in the Boston Gazette to the effect that this 
“important decision” gave “every Englishman [ ] the satisfaction of seeing, 
 
119 See 2 MAY, supra note 74, at 130. 
120 Id. 
121 Schnapper, supra note 90, at 910 (citation omitted).  On the language of the 
resolutions and their timing, see id. at 909–10. 
122 1 EDMUND BURKE, A Short Account of a Late Short Administration (1766), in THE 
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 265, 265 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
rev. ed. 1865). 
123 Id. 
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that his house is his castle, and is not liable to be searched, nor his papers 
pried into by the malignant curiosity of King’s Messengers, and an utter end 
put to that unconstitutional practice . . . .”124 
The Accessible Archives website maintains a searchable collection of 
colonial newspapers.
125
  The most numerous items in the 1760s appear to be 
issues of the South Carolina Gazette, a Patriot organ,
126
 although some 
other papers also appear.  The archive contains close coverage of the 
Wilkesite cases, down to the names of counsel and the amount of damages, 
and includes multiple references, some by Wilkes himself, to the distinct 
evil of seizing papers.
127
  The “seizure of papers” was not an obscure issue 
 
124 Schnapper, supra note 90, at 876 n.38 (quoting BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Feb. 20, 
1764, at 4). 
125 ACCESSIBLE ARCHIVES, http://www.accessible.com/accessible/ (last visited March 4, 
2013). 
126 See SIDNEY KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL NEWSPAPER 147 (1943) 
(listing the Gazette as a Patriot paper). 
127 In chronological order, and abbreviating the Gazette as SCG, see: London, J 17, SCG, 
Oct. 1, 1763 (“J 23.  Yesterday the Rev. Mr. Entick, Mr. Arthur Beardmore, his clerk, and 
Messrs. Wilson and Fell, were discharged by the court of King’s-Bench, from the 
recognizance they were obliged to enter in Michaelmas Term, on account of the several 
numbers of the Monitor, concerning which no prosecution has been carried on.”); id. 
(“J. 7. . . . Yesterday one of the most important points of English liberty was determined at 
Guildhall, before the right hon. lord chief justice Pratt, and a social [sic; should be “special”] 
jury of eminent merchants, in a cause wherein William Huckell, one of the journey men 
printers apprehended on account of the North-Briton, No. 45; was plaintiffs, and the king’s 
messengers defendants; when after a hearing of ear [sic; should be “near”] twelve hours, and 
many learned arguments on both sides, a verdict was given for the plaintiff in 300 l. 
damages, and full costs of on which there was the greatest acclamations that could possibly 
be shewn.”) (this report goes on to list the names of counsel for the parties); id. (“J. 9 . . . 
Thursday morning about ten, came on the cause of James Lindsey, another of the 
journeymen printers, plaintiff, for false imprisonment by three of the king’s messengers, on 
account of No. 45 of the North-Briton. . . .  The whole damages given against the King’s 
messengers in that fourteen causes, which have been tried, amount to 2,900 £ besides all the 
costs of suit, which will be very considerable.  It is remarkable that this is the first attack that 
has been made upon the authority of the secretaries of state, and will abolish the dangerous 
practice of issuing general and anticonstitutional warrants.”); id. (“J 12 . . . Mr. Wilkes 
appeared at all the late trials, and received [t]he repeated congratulations of the public . . . .  
It is very remarkable, that most of the counsel for the journeymen printers were juniors.  Mr. 
serjeant Glynn is the youngest serjeant in England, and Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gardiner, were 
admitted to the bar only last trinity term two years.”); id. (“J. 13.  Next Michaelmas term will 
be tried the actions which Mr. Wilkes has brought against, Philip Carteret Webb and Robert 
Wood, Esq;’s.”); Summary of London Intelligence, from January 1764, to June Inclusive, 
SCG, Oct. 1, 1764 (“May 4th, came or before lord chief justice Pratt. an action brought by 
Mr. Arthur against Mr. Carrington, for forcibly [entering his] house and and [sic] taking 
away many of his paper[s], and for false [imprisonment of] his person six days and on[e] 
half, in the house of Mr. Blackmore, one of the said messengers; when after a [trial] of seven 
hours, hi[s] lordship summed up the [case] in a genteel charge, and the jury went out, who in 
three quarters hour brought in their [verdict] against the defendants for ONE THOUSDAND 
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POUNDS DAMAG[E]S.  Upon the determination of the jury, there was an universal shout 
term [from] a considerable number of spectators.”); We Have Chosen to Fill Up this Day’s 
Paper with a Few Late Articles, SCG, Aug. 25, 1764 (“Monday evening the fourteen 
journeymen printers, who some time since obtained a verdict against the King’s messengers, 
for false imprisonment, received their money from Mess’s, Carrington and Blackmore, two 
of the said messengers, in manner following: thirteen of them who had 200 £ costs and 
damages, received 120 £ each, and one of them, who had 300 £ decreed him, received 170 £ 
and to pay their attorney.”); Charles-Town, April 6, 1765, SCG, Apr. 6, 1765 (“LATE letters 
from London inform us that . . . general warrants, the house had resolved, that it was 
improper and unnecessary to fix, by a vote of the house, what ought to be deemed the law, in 
the particular case of libels, while prosecution were actually depending in the courts of 
law—widely different from what Wednesday’s General Gazette tells us, ‘That the matter 
was cognizable only in the courts of law.’”); European Intelligence, S.C. & AM. GEN. 
GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 1766 (reporting various resolutions offered in the House to condemn 
general warrants and seizures of papers); London, November 14. The Report of His Royal 
Highness the Duke, VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1766  (“Yesterday the Right Hon. Lord Camden 
gave his opinion upon the granting of general warrants by Secretaries of State.  After 
enlarging on and explaining numbers of cases, which lasted two hours and twenty minutes, 
his Lordship declared such warrants (except in cases of high treason) to be illegal, 
oppressive, and unwarrantable.”); Naples, May 24, SCG, Sept. 1, 1766 (report from the 
Brussels Gazette that “Mr. Wilkes, who on advice of the first resolution of the lower house, 
which declared illegal General Warrants for arresting and carrying off persons and papers, 
had ventured to [t]respass into his own country, in the confidence that this bill would pass in 
like manner in the house of peers, has taken the resolution of quitting the kingdom, and 
returning to Paris, finding himself unable to get his proscription taken off, and to procure his 
re-establishments in his rights and privileges.”); London, June 21, S.C. GAZETTE & 
COUNTRY J., Sept. 9, 1766 (containing a fuller quotation from the story from the Brussels 
Gazette: “The Refusal of the upper House to approve of the Bill which had passed the House 
of Commons, touching the Seizure of Papers in the Houses of private Persons, has Caused a 
good Deal of Discontent in the Publick.”); London, March 4. A Letter from Parish, Dated 
February 19, Says, S.C. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., May 24, 1768 (publishing a letter from 
Wilkes that read: “[s]ince the exertion of my firmness in an important moment, no minister 
has once dared to issue a general warrant against your persons, or sign an order for the 
seizure of your papers, and I trust that such despotism will never be again exerted over the 
free subjects of this country.”); To the Worthy Liverymen of the City of London, VA. 
GAZETTE, May 26, 1768 (publishing a letter from Wilkes that read: “The two important 
questions of public liberty, respecting General Warrants and the Seizure of Papers, may 
perhaps place me among those, who have deserved well of mankind, by an undaunted 
firmness, [perse]verance and probity.”); To the Gentlemen, Clargy, and Freeholders of the 
Country of Middlesex, SCG, Aug. 23, 1768 (publishing a letter from Wilkes to Middlesex 
Gentlemen that said: “The General Warrant [under] which I was first apprehended, has been 
adjudged illegal.  The Seizure of my papers was condemned judicially.”); To the Gentlemen, 
Clergy, and Freeholders of the Country of Middlesex, VA. GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1768 (printing 
Wilkes’s letter to Middlesex Gentlemen, including the separate references to general 
warrants and the seizure of papers); London, December 7, SCG, Mar. 16, 1770 (“LONDON, 
DECEMBER 7”: printing Justice Wilmot’s instructions to the jury in Wilkes v. Montagu, in 
part as follows: “the plaintiff had been taken up unlawfully, has been imprisoned seven days, 
had had his papers examined, and seized, that those papers have been likewise and illegally 
taken notice of . . . he has had those papers taken from his house without the pretence of 
right whatever.”). 
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of law; it was the stuff of everyday political conversation in the colonies. 
B. RECEPTION OF THE COMMON LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Although the reception of English law in the newly independent 
American states was not automatic or uniform, a basic pattern emerged.  
The Americans adopted the English common law together with statutes in 
force at the time of Independence, unless the English rule conflicted with a 
natural right or a state constitution’s declaration of rights.128  This meant 
that any judge or justice of the peace considering issuing a warrant to seize 
papers who looked up the law would learn that, under Entick, such a 
warrant was unknown to the common law. 
The Founding-era justice system relied heavily on justices of the peace 
(JPs), prominent citizens who agreed to serve as officials with authority, 
both judicial and executive, over a wide variety of local issues.  In their 
judicial capacity, JPs had power to issue warrants to arrest and to search, as 
well as to interrogate arrested suspects and determine whether to commit or 
bail them.  Professional lawyers wrote encyclopedic manuals to advise 
these amateurs.  The JP manuals provide a fertile source of evidence about 
the Founding-era justice system.
 129
 
Samuel Freeman’s Massachusetts Justice, published in 1795, compiles 
forms for various writs a JP might be called upon to issue.  The only form 
provided under the heading for “search warrant” is for a warrant for stolen 
goods.
130
  Other manuals did not leave the prohibition on warrants for 
papers to implication.  Eliphalet Ladd’s abridgement of a leading English 
manual by Richard Burn, published for New Hampshire JPs in 1792, 
prefaces the regurgitation of Burn with this terse paragraph: “General 
search warrants are illegal.  2 Wils. 288.  Lord Camden.  Bill of rights of 
 
128 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776) (“The common law of England, as-well as so 
much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain 
in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only 
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution, and the 
declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.”); N.J. CONST. art. XXII (1776) 
(“That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been 
heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a 
future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and 
privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall 
remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”). 
129 See Moglen, supra note 88, at 1096 (“[M]anuals provided JPs with an alphabetical 
digest of information relating both to their common law and statutory responsibilities, 
including forms for the dispatch of the most frequent civil and criminal business.  Moreover, 
the manuals contained basic articles on the subject of criminal investigation and adjudication 
that changed very little over the years.”) (citations omitted). 
130 SAMUEL FREEMAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 269–70 (1795). 
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Newhampshire [sic], article XIX.”131  The citation to Entick runs directly 
into the New Hampshire Constitution’s Bill of Rights, which provided, 
“Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”132 
William Walter Hening’s New Virginia Justice, published in 1795, 
quoted the State Trials report of Entick: “On trespass, the jurors found a 
special verdict; and Lord Camden, in delivering the resolution of the court, 
observed, ‘That a warrant to seize and carry away papers in the case of 




Of the Founding-era manuals I have seen, some, like Ladd and 
Hening, cite Entick and expressly prohibit warrants for papers.  Others, like 
Freeman, mention only warrants to search for stolen goods or fugitive 
felons.  None suggests common law authority to issue warrants for papers. 
We have other direct evidence that some Founding-era American 
lawyers were familiar with Entick v. Carrington.  Joseph Hawley was a 
Massachusetts Whig and associate of John Adams.
135
  Hawley’s 
commonplace book includes a version of Otis’s argument in the Writs of 
Assistance case in which Otis implores the court to “tear into rags this 
remnant of Starchamber tyranny.”136  Other accounts of the argument do not 
include this phrase, but identical language appears in Serjeant Glynn’s 
argument in Entick.  If Hawley inserted Glynn’s argument by either 
accident or design, Hawley had to be familiar—intimately familiar—with 
Entick itself. 
Josiah Quincy Jr. was a leader in the Sons of Liberty and another 
associate of John Adams (they were on the same side in the Boston 
Massacre trial).  Quincy’s commonplace book includes a citation to Entick 
in a series of passages about statutory interpretation, with the notation 
“Gen.le War:T.”137  It seems highly unlikely that Hawley, Quincy, and 
Hening were alone.  Hundreds of Americans attended the English Inns of 
 
131 ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT 357 (1792). 
132 N.H. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
133 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 404 (1795) (citing Entick v. 
Carrington, 11 How. St. Tr. 313, 321). 
134 Id. 
135 Regarding Hawley’s use of Glynn’s argument, I rely entirely on SMITH, supra note 
61, at 239–41. 
136 Entick, 2 Wils. at 283, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1039. 
137 2 PORTRAIT OF A PATRIOT: THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PAPERS OF JOSIAH 
QUINCY JUNIOR 229 (Daniel R. Coquillette & Neil L. York eds., 2007). 
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Court.
138
  “Nearly one-half of the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence and three-fifths of those who wrote the constitution had some 
formal legal training.”139  Leaving lawyers aside, printers and polemicists 
had a sharp incentive to know the law of seditious libel. 
C. STATUTORY RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF ENTICK 
Common law could be modified by statute.  Late in the nineteenth 
century, the Boyd Court would assert that an 1863 revenue measure: 
[W]as the first act in this country, and we might say, either in this country or in 
England, so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized the search and 
seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them, for the 
purpose of using them in evidence.
140
 
With one possible nineteenth-century exception, I have not found any such 
pre-1863 statute. 
A statute authorizing seizures of papers was proposed in the 
Pennsylvania legislature in 1780.
141
  Pennsylvania was then governed by a 
unicameral legislature and an executive council, established by a radical 
constitution that was the focal point of local politics.
142
  Pennsylvania, with 
the rest of the United States, was at war with Britain; the treason of General 
Benedict Arnold, who had assumed celebrity status in Philadelphia in 1778, 
was exposed only in the autumn of 1780. 
All I can find of the proposed “bill for apprehending and punishing 
persons corresponding or trading with the enemies of the united states [sic]” 
is a debate on an amendment at the second reading of the bill in the 
House.
143
  The operative language was that the Supreme Executive Council 
would have power to issue warrants “to seize his, her or their papers who 
may be suspected as aforesaid[.]”144 
The proposal was condemned by one writing under the name of 
Zuinglius in the Pennsylvania Gazette.
145
  Zuinglius wrote that “the seizure 
 
138 NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA, 1760–1815, at 48 (2010). 
139 Id. at 48–49. 
140 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886). 
141 See 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 545 (1782) [hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL] (referencing Dec. 5, 1780 journal 
entry). 
142 See ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA 1776–
1790, at 53–121 (1942); ALLEN C. THOMAS, A HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA 143–61 (1913). 
143 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 141, at 545. 
144 Id.  The entry records a vote on a motion to amend the bill to add “and charged by 
oath or affirmation” before “aforesaid.”  The amendment was defeated. 
145 Zuinglius, For the PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1780. 
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of papers” “in the case of Wilkes in England, has been shewn to be contrary 
to common law.”146  The common law of England: 
[H]as been declared, by act of Assembly, to be the birth right of these citizens; and if 
that were not so, yet the possession of private papers, as of our secret thoughts, is a 
natural right which we do not give up when we enter into society, and which no law 
can justly take from us.
147
 
Further, he wrote, “An act of Assembly, like a statute of England, may 
restrain the common law, if it shall please the legislators; though that, I 
presume, will be seldom found adviseable [sic].  But an invasion of the 
natural rights of men is in all cases, tyrannical and arbitrary.”148 
The only difference between Zuinglius in 1780 and Boyd in 1884 is 
resort to the constitutional provision as a trump on the statute.  
Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution included a declaration of rights, including 
a declaration that “the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, 
papers, and possessions free from search and seizure . . . .”149  The 
provision, however, was hortatory, continuing: 
[A]nd therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a 
sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, 
his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought 
not to be granted.
150
 
Given that the applicable constitutional provision did not purport to bind the 
assembly, it might seem reasonable that Zuinglius relied on natural rather 
than constitutional law.  Zuinglius added this final remark: “I shall conclude 
by observing, that this I believe is the only state, where a law of this kind 
has been thought necessary to be established.  Even those states invaded by 
the enemy have not thought it necessary.”151 
Whether the objections of Zuinglius or the cooling of wartime passions 
carried the issue cannot be determined.  The proposed bill for seizing papers 
never passed into law.
152
  What seems clear is that proponents of the power 
 
146 A * note cites “3 Bur. 1763 Wil. b. 151.”  Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 PA CONST. art. I, § 10 (1776). 
150 Id. 
151 Zuinglius, supra note 145. 
152 No such bill appears in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 
1801, at 43–259 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., Wm. Stanley Ray 1904) 
(containing acts and documents from the regular session of the 1780 General Assembly of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), available at http://www.palrb.us/stlarge/browse/get
page.php?volno=10&typedoc=act&sessyr=1780&ss=0. 
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to seize papers felt the need for statutory authority, that opponents objected 
to this heretical idea, that the opponents prevailed, and that the failed 
proposal was an aberration from American practice even in wartime. 
D. STATE SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE PROVISIONS BEFORE THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1789 
After Independence the new states set up governments, typically 
enacting written constitutions accompanied by declarations or bills of 
rights.  The earliest state provisions—Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, all adopted in 1776—were rifle-shot 
prohibitions of general warrants.
153
  All the later provisions—Vermont 
(1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1783)—adopted 
“double-barreled” provisions declaring a general right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures coupled with a specific prohibition of general 
warrants.
154
  In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution with a 
double-barreled provision.
155
  The Vermont, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and (both) Pennsylvania constitutions refer specifically to 
“papers.”156 
E. ANTI-FEDERALIST CONCERNS AND AMENDMENTS PROPOSED 
DURING RATIFICATION OF THE 1789 CONSTITUTION 
The want of a Bill of Rights was the central objection to the proposed 
Constitution of 1789, and this objection included explicit references to 
search and seizure.
157
  Apprehensions about the new government’s search 
powers took formal and collective form in amendments proposed either by 
the majority to accompany ratification, or by delegates dissenting from 
ratification.  Maryland proposed the simple ban on general warrants (so did 
the Pennsylvania dissenters),
158
 while Virginia proposed declaring that 
 
153 See NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 234–35 (1997). 
154 Id. at 234. 
155 Id. at 235. 
156 Id. at 234–35. 
157 See, e.g., Reply to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” [Samuel Bryan] II, Freeman’s 
Journal (Philadelphia), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: 
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES 77, 89 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (“[T]here is 
no declaration, . . . that the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and 
possessions free from search or seizure; and that therefore [general] warrants . . . are contrary 
to that right and ought not to be granted.”).  For a summary of anti-federalist search-and-
seizure concerns, see CUDDIHY, supra note 66, at 673–80. 
158 See Robert Whitehill’s Amendments and the Final Vote, December 12, 1787, in 
I DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 871, 872; In Convention of the Delegates 
of the People of the State of Maryland, April 28, 1788, in II DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 
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“every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and 
seizures of his person, his papers and property; all [general] warrants 
therefore . . . are dangerous and ought not to be granted.”159  North Carolina 
and New York (which had no state constitutional provision) adopted a 
similar formulation including a declaration of a general right to security in 
person, papers, and property.
160
  The Massachusetts ratification message 
proposed amendments but not one about search and seizure.
161
  The 
Massachusetts minority, dissenting from ratification, resolved only that the 
Constitution never be construed “to subject the people to unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their persons, papers or possessions.”162 
Despite the variations a pattern is fairly clear.  After 1776, no state 
constitutional provision reverted to Virginia’s simple ban on general 
warrants.  The only state ratifying majority to propose a federal amendment 
in those terms was Maryland.  The constitutions of Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Vermont included declarations of a 
right to be secure in papers as well as other property; and in their 
ratification messages, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia adopted this 
formulation. 
F. CONGRESSIONAL DRAFTING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
IN 1789 
The drafting history of the Fourth Amendment is largely lost and what 
remains is dubious.
163
  According to the Annals of Congress, James 
Madison’s initial proposal in the House of Representatives read as follows: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons; their houses, their papers, and 
their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not 




The Committee of Eleven sent the following language to the floor of the 
House: “The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, 
 
552, 554 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (proposed amendments). 
159 Form of Ratification, Which was Read and Agreed to by the Convention of Virginia, 
in II DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 158, at 557, 560 (resolutions of Virginia). 
160 See id. at 567 (North Carolina); id. at 538 (New York). 
161 See The Form of Ratification of Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788, in I DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 943–45. 
162 See COGAN, supra note 153, at 232–33. 
163 See CUDDIHY, supra note 66, at 732. 
164 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1790). 
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papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”165 
Elbridge Gerry thought the omission of the words “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” was a “mistake,” and his motion to 
insert them was passed.
166
  Representative Egert Benson of New York 
thought the “declaratory provision [‘by warrants issuing’] was good so far 
as it went” but moved to add the words “and no warrant shall issue.”167  The 
Annals of Congress record this motion as losing, but either this record is 
incorrect or Benson succeeded in adding his proposed language in his 
capacity as chair of a committee on style.  Madison described the published 
reports later included in the Annals as “frequently erroneous and sometimes 
perverted.”168  The Senate made no changes to the House proposal and there 
is no record of the Senate debates.
169
  What emerged from Benson’s 
committee is the language that Congress sent to the country and that we 
have today in the Fourth Amendment. 
G. EARLY PRACTICE 
There are several examples of search-and-seizure practices approved 
during the Founding era.  These include the compelled disclosure of 
documents in civil litigation; the authorization of warrants to enforce 
Founding-era customs duties; and warrants issued to enforce the Sedition 
Act of 1798.  To begin with civil discovery, the common law did not 
provide for any pretrial discovery of documents.
170
  Instead, the party 
seeking discovery could initiate an action in equity, in support of the action 
at law.
171
  Section 15 of the Judiciary Act simplified this arrangement by 
authorizing courts: 
[I]n the trial of actions at law, on motion and due notice thereof being given, to 
require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which 
contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they 
 
165 Id. at 783. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 CUDDHIHY, supra note 66, at 731. 
169 See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 453–54 (2010). 
170 See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1485, at 704 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866) (“Another defect of a similar nature is the want of a 
power in the courts of common law to compel the production of deeds, books, writings, and 
other things, which are in the custody, or power of one of the parties, and are material to the 
right, title, or defence of the other.”) (footnote omitted). 
171 Id. 
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might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in 
chancery . . . .
172
 
Boyd seems quite accurate, however, that “the ordinary rules of proceeding 
in chancery” did not extend to compelling the disclosure of documents 




The early revenue laws authorized searches for, and seizures of, 
undutied goods.  For example, the first Act to regulate the Collection of 
Duties authorized warrants for “goods, wares and merchandise” subject to 
duty.
174
  No authority to seize papers is mentioned. 
Even under the English law of seditious libel, the prosecution had to 
prove that the defendant was somehow involved in publishing the libel—as 
author, printer, or distributor.  Section 3 of the 1798 Sedition Act went 
further, providing that the accused might “give in evidence in his defence, 
the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel.  And 
the jury who shall try the cause shall have a right to determine the law and 
the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.”175 
Quite aside from the alleged libel itself, other papers, such as 
correspondence and contracts, might be useful evidence of authorship or 
publication.  They might also, at least potentially, admit the falsity of the 
publication.  The Act said nothing about enforcement.  Discussions of 
enforcement make no mention of warrants to seize papers.
176
  Republican 
journalists were indicted by grand juries and arrested on warrants, but I 
have seen no evidence of search warrants to search for and seize personal 
papers. 
Judge Hobart’s warrant to arrest William Durell, dated July 14, 1799, 
directs the marshal only to “apprehend and take William Durell, of Mount 
Pleasant in the Country of Westchester, Printer, and to bring him forthwith 
before me, to answer unto such matters of misdemeanor as on behalf of the 
said United States shall be objected against him,” followed by a particular 
 
172 Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
173 See, e.g., 2 STORY, supra note 170, § 1494 at 710 (“[Courts of equity] will not compel 
a discovery in aid of a criminal prosecution; or of a penal action; or of a suit in its nature 
partaking of such a character; or in a case involving moral turpitude; for it is against the 
genius of the common law to compel a party to accuse himself; and it is against the general 
principles of equity to aid in the enforcement of penalties or forfeitures.”). 
174 Ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). 
175 Sedition Act, ch. 73, § 3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).  
176 See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAW AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 182–87 (1956). 
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allegation of criminal libel.
177
  Anthony Haswell, another publisher charged 
with sedition, described the warrant for his arrest: “You are hereby 
commanded to arrest Anthony Haswell, of Bennington, Printer, and cause 
him forthwith to appear before our circuit court of the United States, now 
sitting in Rutland.  Of this fail not at your peril.”178  In marked contrast to 
the Wilkes and Entick warrants, no power to search, let alone to seize 
papers, is included in the warrants for Durell and Haswell.
179
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that Americans followed the 
Wilkes affair with great interest, absorbed the message of the separate 
iniquity of seizing papers, carried Entick into American law, and refused to 
tamper with the common law by statute for seventy years after 1791.  Did 
they understand the Fourth Amendment to perpetuate the common law rule 
against any statutory modification whatsoever?  That question did not reach 
the Supreme Court until the famous ruling in Boyd. 
IV. THE UNTOLD STORY OF BOYD V. UNITED STATES 
A. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 
The story of the Boyd case properly begins with a statute authorizing 
customs officers to seize the books and papers of importers suspected of 
evading taxes.  The story begins with a statute because Entick, quite aside 
from the federal Constitution, declared the common law.  Louisiana 
excepted because of her civil law tradition, all the American states received 
the English common law after Independence.
180
  Typically reception was 
qualified by rejecting doctrines contrary to fundamental rights or by 
acknowledging that the legislators could alter the common law rules.
181
 
Entick was a libertarian ruling and was not contrary to fundamental 
rights.  So until the prohibition on warrants for papers was either 
 
177 The National Archives has posted an image of the warrant, in Hobart’s hand, on its 
website.  See United States v. William Durell: Violating the Alien and Sedition Acts, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/images/alien-and-sedition.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
178 Tyler Resch, Anthony Haswell is Jailed!, BENNINGTON MUSEUM, http://www.benning 
tonmuseum.org/anthony-haswell.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
179 A review of all known prosecutions under the Sedition Act makes no mention of any 
search warrants.  See Gordon T. Belt, Sedition Act of 1798—A Brief History of Arrests, 
Indictments, Mistreatment & Abuse, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 29, 2009), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_
cases.pdf. 
180 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1985). 
181 See id.; Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 337 n.9 (2001) (“Founding-era 
receptions of common law, whether by state constitution or state statute, generally provided 
that common-law rules were subject to statutory alteration.”) (citations omitted). 
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superseded by statute or overruled judicially, a warrant for papers would be 
a nullity at common law.  Entick v. Carrington is cited, either by court or 
counsel, in sixteen reported antebellum American decisions.
182
  Many of 
these are not search-and-seizure cases at all, and not all of the search cases 
say anything about papers.
183
 
Nonetheless the citations indicate that Entick was good law in 
antebellum America.  The three cases that discuss private papers, moreover, 
suggest that the private-papers aspect of Entick was just as authoritative as 
any other aspect of the decision.  In United States v. Crandell,
184
 Crandell 
stood trial for criminal libel and, citing Entick, objected to the introduction 
of pamphlets found in execution of a warrant to “search for and seize any 
incendiary pamphlets or papers which should be found in the defendant’s 
possession . . . .”185  The court ruled “that if the matter now proposed to be 
read, is not charged in the indictment, and would be, of itself, a substantive 
libel, and therefore indictable, it cannot be given in evidence.”186  
Contraband or instrumentalities of crime were not exempt from seizure 
simply because they happened to be paper, but papers of evidentiary value 
that were not at least alleged to be criminal in themselves should not have 
been seized and could not be used at trial.  The jury acquitted. 
In Commonwealth v. Dana,
187
 the defendant challenged his conviction 
for possessing illegal lottery tickets on the ground that the tickets had been 
seized on the authority of an invalid warrant.  After discussing Entick in 
detail, the court held that: 
[T]he right of search and seizure does not depend on the question whether the papers 
or property seized were intended to be used in evidence against the offender or not. 
The possession of lottery tickets with the intent to sell them was a violation of law. 
The defendant’s possession, therefore, was unlawful, and the tickets were liable to 
 
182 A Westlaw search for “(entick /s carrington) & date(before 1860)” performed October 
23, 2011, returned sixteen hits. 
183 In Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814), the plaintiff sued in trespass and the 
court, having ruled defendant’s warrant was void for generality, cited Entick for the 
proposition “that if a warrant which is against law be granted, such as no justice of the peace 
or other magistrate, high or low, has power to issue, the justice who issues and the officer 
who executes it are liable in an action of trespass.”  Id. at 45.  In Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), plaintiff sued defendant for trespass, and the court sustained 
defendant’s demurrer based on a warrant for stolen flour.  Id. at 266.  The court cited Entick 
for the proposition that a particularized warrant for stolen goods, “so well guarded, [is] a 
lawful authority.”  Id. at 265. 
184 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 683 (1836). 
185 Id. at 691. 
186 Id. at 692. 
187 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841). 
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The second ground of decision in Dana was that illegally seized items 
could be used in evidence notwithstanding their tainted history.
189
  This 
ground, however, reinforces the distinction between private papers and 
contraband papers.  The accused would have the right to the return of 
illegally seized papers, unless they were contraband.
190
 
In Robinson v. Richardson,
191
 the court struck down a statute 
authorizing creditors to obtain warrants for books and papers of insolvent 
debtors.  After discussing Entick, the court held the statute unconstitutional 
because it authorized warrants for the benefit of civil litigants.
192
 
There is no negative reference to Entick v. Carrington in any of the 
sixteen reported decisions.  Nor does any reported antebellum decision 
permit the seizure of private papers under warrant. 
Any official contemplating a warrant to seize private papers who 
looked up the law would have concluded that such a warrant was illegal.  
Robinson shows how the constitutional issue could arise: A legislature 
could pass a statute that expressly authorized the courts to issue search 
warrants for private papers.  The statute would trump Entick given Entick’s 
role as a common law precedent.  At that point the statute would be subject 
to constitutional challenge, and the issue would arise as to whether Entick’s 
per se prohibition of seizing private papers was incorporated into the 
constitutional search-and-seizure provision.  The first federal statute 
authorizing warrants to seize papers was a Civil War revenue measure 
adopted in 1863. 
 
188 Id. at 337. 
189 See id. (“Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this 
is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence.”). 
190 The Supreme Court would not reach this result until more than fifty years after Dana, 
but the logic is straightforward.  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) 
(holding that “the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official 
of the United States, acting under color of his office, in direct violation of the constitutional 
rights of the defendant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was 
heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application 
a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored 
these letters to the accused”). 
191 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454 (1859). 
192 Id. at 457 (“All searches therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the 
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions of another, in order to 
secure a personal advantage, and not with any design to afford aid in the administration of 
justice in reference to acts or offences in violation of penal laws, must be held to be 
unreasonable, and consequently under our constitution unwarrantable, illegal and void.”). 
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B. THE 1863 STATUTE 
Waging war costs money, and the Civil War was no exception.  Prior 
to hostilities the government had relied largely on import duties to fund its 
operations.
193
  As it became clear that the war would not be short and cheap, 
Congress resorted to paper money, excise taxes, a rudimentary income tax, 
and increases in tariffs.
194
  By the end of the war, domestic excise taxes 
were the single largest source of federal revenue, but tariffs were still 
supplying more revenue than the income tax.
195
 
Wherever there are taxes, there will also be tax evasion.  In November 
of 1862, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase dispatched the department’s 
solicitor, Edwin Jordan, to investigate and report on corruption in the New 
York Customs House.  Chase forwarded Jordan’s report to E.B. 




Jordan reported what was notorious already—corruption in the 
customs house was rampant.  While there was “very considerable direct 
smuggling” of “jewelry, laces, rich silks, and other costly goods,” “the most 
usual mode in which frauds [were] committed [was] by the use of invoices, 
in which the goods to which they relate[d] [were] falsely described, or 
undervalued.”197  According to Jordan, “Under existing laws, there is no 
adequate security against the use of false and fraudulent invoices, and there 
would often be great difficulty, even on the part of the most competent and 
faithful officers, especially in cases of undervaluation, in detecting the 
frauds . . . .”198 
Jordan reiterated his earlier proposal for legislative reforms.  These 
proposals included a specialized enforcement officer in Washington, D.C., 
regulation of invoice practices, criminal penalties for fraud, prohibitions on 
“emoluments” to customs agents from importers, and “[p]rovisions 
designed to facilitate the procurement of proof of fraudulent practices.”199 
 
193 See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 13–14 (2d ed. 2004) 
(“[T]he tax regime that followed the creation of the new constitutional order was based on 
customs duties; it lasted until the Civil War, making it the longest in American history.”). 
194 See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 44 (2002). 
195 See BROWNLEE, supra note 193, at 35 (noting that excise taxes accounted for 50% of 
federal revenue, tariffs for 29%, the income tax for 21%). 
196 See S.P. CHASE, TO PREVENT AND PUNISH FRAUD, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 18 (1863) 
(letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the House of Representatives). 
197 Id. at 5. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 8. 
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Chase sent Jordan’s report to Washburne on February 9, 1863.  The 
next day, Washburne introduced Jordan’s proposed legislation.200  On 
March 3, An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Revenue passed 
into law.
201
  The provisions “designed to facilitate the procurement of 
proof” included the following from the seventh section of the Act202: 
[W]henever it shall be made to appear, by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the district 
judge of any district within the United States, that any fraud on the revenue has been 
at any time actually committed, or attempted . . . said judge shall forthwith issue his 
warrant, directed to the collector of the port . . . to enter any place or premises where 
any invoices, books, or papers relating to such merchandise or fraud are deposited, 
and to take and carry the same away to be inspected; and any invoices, books or 
papers so received or taken shall be retained by the officer receiving the same, for the 
use of the United States, so long as the retention thereof may be necessary, subject to 
the control and direction of the Solicitor of the Treasury.
203
 
The Boyd opinion asserts that: 
[This] act of 1863 was the first act in this country, and we might say, either in this 
country or in England, so far as we have been able to ascertain, which authorized the 
search and seizure of a man’s private papers, or the compulsory production of them, 
for the purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case, or in a 
proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property.
204
 
Radical as it may have been, the measure excited no floor debate that I 
have found.  In context this is not surprising.  The bill passed into law on 
March 3, the last day of a session of Congress dealing with the gravest 
crisis in American history.  Following the heavily qualified Union victory at 
Antietam the previous September, Lincoln declared emancipation on 
January 1, 1863.
205
  The Union was engaged in a desperate effort to 
suppress treason committed for the sake of slavery; the “victory” at 
 
200 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 861 (1863) (statement of Rep. Washburne). 
201 Ch. 76, 12 Stat. 737 (1863); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1489 (1863). 
202 The enacted legislation appears identical to the proposed bill, H.R. 736, 37th Cong. 
(1863), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llhb&fileName=037/llhb
037.db&recNum=3559. 
In the Senate, Fessenden, as chair of the Committee on Finance, introduced the 
measure as S.B. 506 on February 6 and then with minor amendments not touching the 
warrant provision again on February 10.  See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 750, 837 
(1863) (statements of Sen. Fessenden).  The markup of the Senate Bill dated February 10 is 
available online at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=037/llsb
037.db&recNum=1848.  Given the dates, it seems plausible to suppose that Chase had 
conveyed Jordan’s report to Fessenden but that the report was printed only by the House. 
203 Ch. 76, § 7, 12 Stat. 737, 740. 
204 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886). 
205 See, e.g., 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR 707 (1986). 
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Antietam cost 12,000 casualties.
206
  That same third of March, as the 
session expired, Congress passed the first conscription act.
207
  There was 
little time for fussing over revenue measures.  If there had been time, it was 
not a season for constitutional scruples.
208
 
C. POSTWAR LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES 
The war left the Union deeply in debt, but economic expansion and 
end-of-war spending permitted a degree of postwar tax relief.
209
  The 
postbellum Republican Congress chose to retain high tariffs and an income 
tax while phasing out unpopular excise taxes.
210
  The continued reliance on 
import duties implied the continued need to police fraud in the customs 
houses. 
On March 2, 1867 (again the very end of the session, and the same day 
as the income tax bill was enacted
211
), Congress passed An Act to regulate 
the Disposition of the Proceeds of Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures incurred 
under the Laws relating to the Customs.
212
  The second section of the Act 
reiterated the seventh section of the 1863 Act, the sole modification being 
that warrants to seize books and papers were to be directed to the marshal of 
the court rather than the customs collector.
213
  Again there appears to have 
been no floor debate.  Again it was the last day of session, and other 
business pressed (the income tax bill and the Tenure in Office Act
214
 passed 
that same day). 
Constitutional issues were, however, emerging.
216
  In 1868 Congress 
 
206 Id. at 702. 
207 See, e.g., RICHARD F. SELCER, CIVIL WAR AMERICA 1850–1875, at 62 (2006). 
208 Cf. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
209 See WEISMAN, supra note 194, at 93–96. 
210 BROWNLEE, supra note 193, at 36–39; WEISMAN, supra note 194, at 95–103. 
211 Tax Anti-Injunction Act of 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 475 (1867) (current version at 
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006)). 
212 Ch. 188, 14 Stat. 547 (1867); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 2004 (1867). 
213 Id. § 2. 
214 Tenure of Office Act of 1867, ch. 154, §§ 1, 3, 6, 14 Stat. 431 (1867) (repealed 1887).  
The Act provided the predicate for impeaching President Andrew Johnson. 
216 I have seen a reference to one such challenge from 1867, a document by Sidney 
Webster called, “In matter of petition of Galwey & Casado, and order of Judge Betts thereon 
power of the government to enter private premises, search, seize, and carry away private 
papers.”  I have not yet seen this particular source.  Webster was a prominent lawyer for 
importers and is said to have won the first million-dollar fee in American history by 
successfully representing the importer of French silk ribbons.  See 19 THE HARV. 
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adopted An Act for the Protection in certain Cases of Persons making 
Disclosures as Parties, or testifying as Witnesses.
217
  The Act provided  
that: 
[N]o answer or other pleading of any party, and no discovery, or evidence obtained by 
means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in this or any foreign 
country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such party or 
witness, or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, or in any 
proceeding by or before any officer of the United States, in respect to any crime, or 
for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture by reason of any act or omission of 
such party or witness.
218
 
The purpose of the 1868 statute was to facilitate revenue collections by 
obviating constitutional objections to compelled discovery.
219
 
The relationship between the 1868 exclusionary rule and the 
authorization of warrants for papers in the 1867 Act is unclear.  The Boyd 
opinion asserts that the 1868 law “abrogated and repealed the most 
objectionable part of the act of 1867 . . . .”220  On the other hand, in the 
circuit court decision Stockwell v. United States, rendered in the April term 
of court in 1870, Judge Clifford rejected challenges both to the legality of a 
warrant for papers and to the use of the seized documents in evidence.
221
  
The court rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge to § 2 of the 1867 Act 
because “it is not perceived that any greater objection can be taken to a 
warrant to search for books, invoices, and other papers appertaining to an 
illegal importation than to one authorizing such a search for the imported 
goods.”222  Judge Clifford rejected the objection to use of the seized papers 
in evidence because “invoices, books, or papers so seized, like the 
implements of crime, or stolen goods seized on search warrants, may in a 
proper case be given in evidence against the offender and perpetrator of the 
 
GRADUATES MAG. 170 (1910). 
217 Ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (1868). 
218 Id. § 1. 
219 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 951 (1868) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen). 
220 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886). 
221 Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116 (C.C.D. Me. 1870), aff’d, 80 U.S. 531 
(1871).  The Supreme Court opinion does not address the legality of the warrant or the 
admissibility of the documents.  The circuit court opinion identifies both challenges: 
Two objections were taken by the defendants, at the trial, to the admissibility of the books, 
papers and documents as offered in evidence:  I.  That the court was not authorized to issue nor 
the marshal to execute the warrant in question.  II.  That the district attorney could not, if 
objected to by the defendants, put in evidence against them papers from his own possession, 
obtained and placed there by force of the warrant. 
Id. at 120. 
222 Id. at 121. 
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fraud.”223 
Before the Supreme Court, however, Stockwell raised only two issues: 
(1) the use of a civil action to recover a double penalty under an Act of 
1823, and (2) a jury instruction that imputed Stockwell’s knowledge of 
illegal importation to other members of his firm.
224
  The Supreme Court 
rejected these challenges.
225
  Stockwell sheds no light on the constitutional 
issues surrounding the seizure of papers, but does indicate that the 1868 Act 
did not put an immediate end to the practice of issuing warrants for papers 
under the 1867 Act.
226
  Arguably, the 1868 exclusionary rule might have 
been limited to oral testimony and documents surrendered by the target, 
exclusive of documents seized under warrant.
227
 
In 1872, Cephas Brainerd, another lawyer for import interests, 
published a pamphlet attacking both the seizure of papers and the reliance 
on informants in customs investigations.
228
  Brainerd invoked Entick and 
the resolutions condemning general warrants and seizures of papers: 
This inquisitorial warrant is open to every condemnatory observation made by Lord 
Camden In the case of the general warrants in the time of Wilkes, Entick and [the] 
“monitor or British Freeholder”. . . . upon a charge made on information and belief 
that a crime has been committed in regard to a particular importation, all the books 
and papers of a mercantile firm are stripped from their warehouse or dwellings under 
the pretence that they contain evidence of the particular crime, and these are retained 
in the custody of Customs House officials and informers, all interested pecuniarily in 
the discovery of a fraud, until they see fit to return them to their owner.
229
 
Brainerd followed up with a sarcastic bow to evenhandedness, noting that 
in all fairness it should be noted that one judge—Scroggs!—had vouched 
for the legality of general warrants.
230
 
Despite the clarity of his claim that the warrants authorized by the 
 
223 Id. at 123 (citing Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841)). 
224 See Brief of the Plaintiff in Error at 3–4, Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531 
(1871) (No. 76-5876). 
225 Stockwell, 80 U.S. at 549–52. 
226 See Transcript of Record at 20–21, Stockwell, 80 U.S. 531 (observing that the search 
warrant issued March 30, 1868, and the statute became law on February 25, 1868). 
227 This was the position taken later by the court in United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 
417, 419 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (“The statute speaks of evidence or discovery obtained from 
the party or witness, and not that obtained from invoices and bills of lading which have been 
wrested from him.”). 
228 CEPHAS BRAINERD, THE CUSTOMS REVENUE LAWS: SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR 
AMENDMENT, IN REGARD TO THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS; THE DISTRIBUTION OF PENALTIES; THE 
LIMITATION OF ACTS, ETC. (1872). 
229 Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted). 
230 Id. at 15. 
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1867 Act are “flatly in contradiction of Article IV of the Amendments,”231 
Brainerd did not propose outright repeal.  Brainerd’s proposal “concede[d] 
the right of, and the necessity as well for a seizure and examination of 
books and papers—it seeks only to limit its exercise within a liberal 
construction, toward the Government, of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”232  His proposal for a reformed process for seizing papers 
remains interesting because it suggested some middle ground between 
inviolability for papers under Entick and Boyd and the modern equivalence 
of papers with other “effects.” 
Brainerd proposed requiring an affidavit by a government official 
alleging specific facts amounting to a prima facie case of fraud before a 
warrant would issue.
233
  Moreover, he proposed sealing the papers to be 
seized and having them inspected within two days in front of a United 
States commissioner with a right of appearance for the importer personally 
or through counsel.
234
  Any specific entries or items could be used in 
evidence only if certified copies were filed with the clerk of the court, and 
both sides would have the right to memorialize entries for use as 
evidence.
235
  After twelve days, the books would have to be “returned 
without mutilation.”236 
The most sophisticated and celebrated constitutional attack on the 
seizure of private papers came from Sherburne Blake Eaton.
237
  Eaton’s 
clients eventually came to include J.P. Morgan and Thomas Edison,
238
 from 
which we may infer that he was the best that money could buy.  His first 
claim to fame as a lawyer, however, apparently followed his attack on the 
constitutionality of warrants for papers. 
In February 1874, Eaton testified before the House Ways and Means 
Committee.
239
  Eaton laid out the theory the Boyd Court would later adopt, 
plus another constitutional argument.  Eaton invoked both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth.
240
  He had 
 
231 Id. at 12. 
232 Id. at 16–17. 
233 Id. at 17–18. 
234 Id. at 17. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 For a biography of Eaton, see 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 130 (1897).  
238 Id.  On Eaton representing J.P. Morgan as well as Edison, see FORREST MCDONALD, 
INSULL: THE RISE AND FALL OF A BILLIONAIRE UTILITY TYCOON 31 (1961). 
239 H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, at 68–86 (1874) (testimony before the Committee on Ways 
and Means regarding moities and customs-revenue laws).  Brainerd testified the same day. 
240 Id. at 70 (statement of S.B. Eaton). 
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considerable authority for both arguments. 
Eaton supported his Fourth Amendment argument by an extended 
appeal to Entick v. Carrington.
241
  Eaton, however, also made a due process 
argument.  Eaton quoted the then-controlling Supreme Court decision in 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company.242  The test 
of due process under Murray’s Lessee was whether a procedure was known 
to the English common law, and Entick had emphatically declared that a 
warrant to seize papers was not known to the common law.  So in 1874, 
Eaton’s reliance on Murray’s Lessee was compelling. 
Eaton’s “argument before the congressional committee of ways and 
means, for the reform of the customs and revenue laws and the repeal of the 
statute authorizing moieties and the seizure of books and papers, attracted 
wide attention in the United States.”243  It was also “translated into French 
and German [and] was circulated on the continent of Europe.”244  His client, 
the New York Chamber of Commerce, reprinted his testimony as a 
pamphlet.
245
  Eaton had written the first draft of Boyd twelve years in 
advance. 
D. THE 1874 ACT 
Two things changed in the twelve years between Eaton’s testimony 
and the Boyd decision.  First, Congress replaced the 1867 authorization of 
warrants to seize books and papers with a quite different procedure.
246
  
Under the new procedure, the district courts lost the authority to issue 
warrants to seize books and papers.  Instead, in all revenue actions “other 
than criminal,” the government could serve a demand on the defendant: 
[A]nd if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice, 
or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the said motion shall be 
taken as confessed unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained 
 
241 For Eaton’s argument regarding Entick, see id. at 76. 
242 Id. at 71 (statement of S.B. Eaton) (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
277 (1856)) (“‘We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in 
conflict with any of its provisions.  If not found to be so, we must look to those settled 
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before 
the emigration of our ancestors.’”). 
243 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 237, at 130. 
244 Id. 
245 S.B. EATON, A DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF 
MARCH 2, 1867, AUTHORIZING THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS FOR ALLEGED FRAUDS 
UPON THE REVENUE (1874). 
246 An Act to Amend the Customs-Revenue Laws and to Repeal Moieties, ch. 391, 18 
Stat. 187 (1874). 
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to the satisfaction of the court.
247
 
If produced, the documents could be inspected by the government in the 




No longer could papers be seized on authority of a warrant.  On the 
other hand, importers who refused to open their books to government 
officers would be presumed (practically conclusively) to have violated the 
revenue laws.  The statute excepted criminal proceedings but not 
proceedings for forfeitures or penalties. 
From the government’s standpoint, the new procedure had another 
advantage.  Judge Clifford’s opinion in Stockwell had held that seized 
papers could be used in evidence, notwithstanding the 1868 Act’s bar on 
using evidence obtained by any “judicial proceeding” in forfeiture 
proceedings and criminal prosecutions.
249
  There appears to have been at 
least some authority for the contrary view, i.e., that papers seized on a 
warrant issued under the 1867 Act could not be used in evidence by force of 
the 1868 Act.
250
  So one can read the 1874 disclose-or-confess procedure as 
a concession to Eaton’s constitutional arguments, a government escape 
hatch from the 1868 exclusionary rule, or both. 
The courts soon heard challenges to the constitutionality of the 
disclose-or-confess procedure.  The early cases all involved forfeiture 
proceedings against liquor distilleries, and they all reached the same result 
 
247 Id. § 5, 18 Stat. at 187. 
248 Id. 
249 See Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116, 123 (C.C.D. Me. 1870), aff’d, 80 U.S. 
531 (1871). 
250 See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 73 (statement of S.B. Eaton) (citing 
Bingham v. Jordan, Marsh & Co.) (“In the United States court of Massachusetts, in a recent 
case of great general interest, it was held by Judge Lowell, that, in view of the existence of 
this prohibitory statute, it was ‘difficult to understand’ how the inspection of books and 
papers is to be availed by the Government for any useful purpose, since this act provides that 
no evidence thus obtained shall be used for any penalty, or in any criminal action; that any 
evidence thus obtained might be used to collect duties, or be used by the collector in his 
future dealings with the same party or others; but that it is no part of the law to seize books 
and papers for the benefit of the collector, in the administration of his duties as collector.”).  
Eaton gave no citation for Bingham but may have been referring to In re Jordan, 13 F. Cas. 
1077 (D. Mass. 1873) (holding that revenue agents responsible for examining books and 
papers described in warrant could not assist marshal in separating papers described in 
warrant from other documents).  The reported opinion does not include the “difficult to 
understand” language, so it seems more likely either that Eaton referred to an opinion in the 
same matter that went unreported or that the official report omits Judge Lowell’s remark 
about the new exclusionary rule.  Eaton went on to say that the 1868 exclusionary rule was 
inadequate because the government could seize papers and then introduce other evidence 
derived from them.  H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 74. 
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by very similar reasoning.
251
  The distilleries’ Fourth Amendment claims 
were rejected on the theory that distillers consent to the government’s rules 
when they enter that closely regulated trade—an early version of the 
modern “administrative search” doctrine.  The Fifth Amendment claims 
were rejected by characterizing in rem forfeiture proceedings as civil rather 
than criminal cases. 
The second important legal development that occurred between 
Eaton’s testimony in 1874 and the Boyd decision in 1886 was the Supreme 
Court’s retreat from the rigid historical test of due process.  In Hurtado v. 
California, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
challenge to felony prosecutions initiated by information filed by a 
prosecutor as opposed to an indictment returned by a grand jury.
252
  The 
common law did not permit felony informations, so Hurtado had a strong 
claim under the historical test of Murray’s Lessee. 
Hurtado equated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
with its Fifth Amendment predecessor, but then recharacterized the 
historical test as permitting any procedure known to the common law rather 
than forbidding any procedure not known to the common law.
253
  The 
negative version of the historical test would “deny every quality of the law 
but its age, and . . . render it incapable of progress or improvement.  It 
would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed 
to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”254 
Hurtado asserted limits beyond which legislatures could not go, but 
described those limits in normative rather than historical terms: 
[Due process] refers to that law of the land in each State which derives its authority 
from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the 
people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.
255
 
This natural law interpretation (substantive due process, we would call it 
today) allowed the Court to balance liberty against the police power.  
Eaton’s due process argument against warrants for business records might 
still prevail if a majority of the Court concluded that such warrants were 
 
251 See United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149 (E.D. Wis. 1875); United 
States v. Mason, 26 F. Cas. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1875); United States v. Distillery No. 28, 25 F. 
Cas. 868 (D. Ind. 1875). 
252 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). 
253 Id. at 534. 
254 Id. at 529. 
255 Id. at 535. 
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“contrary” to “fundamental principles.”256  But it might also lose under the 
amorphous new test.  After Hurtado, the clean kill-shot set up by the 
juxtaposition of Murray’s Lessee and Entick v. Carrington was gone. 
E. BOYD 
Why did the issue take so long to reach the Supreme Court?  Stockwell 
did reach the Court, but only on other issues.  We don’t know how often the 
government resorted to the formal disclose-or-confess procedure, or how 
often individuals cooperated “voluntarily” with official requests for records.  
We can imagine, however, the obstacles to litigating the issue posed by the 
lower court rulings of 1875, and realize in the process both how unusual the 
facts of Boyd actually were and how intertwined the various propositions in 
the final opinion turn out to be. 
The lower court cases upholding the disclose-or-confess procedure had 
rejected Fourth Amendment claims either because the taxpayer consented to 
reasonable regulations by entering a business like the liquor trade,
257
 or 
because the disclose-or-confess procedure involved no physical trespass.
258
  
They rejected the Fifth Amendment claim either because tax proceedings 
were civil
259




Boyd was factually quite distinctive.
261 
  The government needed glass 
on an emergency basis, and the Boyds sold the government glass from stock 
 
256 H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 264, supra note 239, at 76, 79; see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 
535. 
257 See United States v. Distillery No. 28, 25 F. Cas. 868, 870 (D. Ind. 1875) (“No one 
can engage in the manufacture and sale of spirits without the consent of the government.  
That consent is obtained on certain terms and conditions.”). 
258 See United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1875) (“The 
cases are not like those condemned by the courts of England where general warrants 
empowered the officers to enter any private house, and intrude upon the privacy of any 
citizen and seize private papers or property for purposes of personal prosecution on any 
charge the crown might choose to make.”). 
259 See Distillery No. 28, 25 F. Cas. at 869 (“This proceeding is entirely independent of 
any criminal prosecutions which have been commenced or which may hereafter be 
commenced against them.”). 
260 See United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 417, 419 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (holding that 
business records seized by warrant issued under the 1867 Act were not “evidence [ ]obtained 
from the party” and therefore were not excluded from evidence by the 1868 Act).  The issue 
was statutory, but the court’s reasoning applied to any potential Fifth Amendment claims as 
well: the defendant “has been perfectly silent.  He has disclosed nothing.  He has discovered 
nothing.”  Id. 
261 For the lower court proceedings, see United States v. Boyd, 24 F. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 
1885) (the civil forfeiture case) and United States v. Boyd, 24 F. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (the 
criminal case). 
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on which the duty had been paid in exchange for permission to import a 
replacement quantity duty-free.
262
  They allegedly brought in more glass 
duty-free than they had supplied to the government in the first place.
263
   
So, to begin with, there was nothing especially sinister about glass.   
Liquor was a dangerous, traditionally regulated commodity that could be 
prohibited altogether in the exercise of the police power.  Glass was a 
quotidian object of lawful commerce.  Saying those trading in glass 
voluntarily shouldered whatever rules the government wanted to make 
about glass would have permitted the liquor exception to swallow the 
general rule against unreasonable searches. 
Second, while revenue violations typically were potentially criminal, 
actual criminal prosecutions were not the norm.  The Boyd brothers not 
only lost the action for debt; they were indicted criminally and convicted.  
Whether the invoice disclosed in response to the disclose-or-confess notice 
was used in the criminal trial is not clear from the report.  The Supreme 
Court’s ruling reversed both the civil and the criminal judgments,264 
suggesting that the invoice was used in the criminal trial.  Even if it were 
not, the potential for self-incrimination in a case where the taxpayers were 
prosecuted criminally was much more salient than in the run-of-the-mine 
cases of forfeitures or penalties. 
Third, the Boyds had neither voluntarily surrendered the invoice nor 
withheld it to suffer the statutory inference of guilt.  They had surrendered 
it under constitutional protest and raised, albeit in a clumsy way, the 




262 The gist of the criminal accusation was as follows: The defendants were indicted 
under § 12 of the Act of June 22, 1874, for the fraudulent entry of thirty-five cases of 
imported plate-glass as free, by means of a false and fraudulent letter.  See Boyd, 24 F. at 
693–94.  The government had previously procured from the defendants a large quantity of 
their own plate-glass—for immediate use in the construction of the United States courthouse 
and post-office building in Philadelphia—at a discount from the domestic price equal to the 
rate of duties, under an agreement with the defendants that they might import, free of duty, 
new glass in the same amount to replace that furnished to the government.  See id. at 694.  
The proofs tended to show that under this arrangement the defendants had previously 
imported, and entered free of duty, a much larger quantity of glass than sufficient to replace 
what they had thus supplied to the government.  See id. 
263 Id. 
264 This is not clear from the Supreme Court opinion, but the West system shows the 
criminal conviction reversed by the Supreme Court opinion. 
265 See Brief of the Plaintiff in Error at 22–24, Boyd v. United States, in 8 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 479, 501–03 (1975) [hereinafter Brief].  
Most of the brief is devoted to technical issues of forfeiture law and jury instructions.  The 
constitutional issue is not even listed in the assignments of error, Brief at 4–5, and instead is 
mentioned as an afterthought.  The brief states apologetically, “Time does not permit us to 
2013] DEAREST PROPERTY 97 
Fourth, the disputed invoice was for twenty-nine cases of glass legally 
imported.  It was not contraband or the instrumentality of any fraud.  Its 
sole value to the government was to show that the duty-free letter for the 
thirty-five cases imported later was obtained by fraud. 
So Boyd’s various propositions are all important to the result.  Only if 
(1) the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are to be liberally construed could the 
Court say that the Boyds had been searched or, in the forfeiture proceeding, 
incriminated.
266
  Only if (2) warrants for papers were unreasonable per se 
would the adversary process afforded the Boyds fail to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment.  Even granting that (3) the threat of adverse inference 
inducing the discovery of the invoice was tantamount to unconstitutional 
search and seizure, the usual rule, exemplified by Dana, was that illegal 
procurement would not block admission of evidence.  So (4) the use of a 
lawful document against its owner had to be characterized as compelled 
self-incrimination before the Boyds could win. 





 and the late Bill Stuntz
269
 have, in 
 
elaborate, as we wish, the propositions hinted at in the foregoing observations.  Id.  We shall 
endeavor to do so orally, citing” inter alia, Entick and Murray’s Lessee.  Id.  Really 
competent counsel would not have relied on Murray’s Lessee two years after Hurtado, at 
least not without a fuller discussion.  But Murray’s Lessee and Entick feature prominently in 
Eaton’s attack on the statute.  The brief is what one would expect if someone at the last 
minute favored Boyd’s lawyers, Edwin B. Smith and Stephen G. Clarke, with a copy of 
Eaton’s pamphlet. 
266 See 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, at 740 (1987) 
(“Justice Bradley had displayed a determination to give the Amendments a large meaning, 
without concern for the literal texts.”). 
267 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 788 
(1994) (“[T]he spirit inspiring Boyd and its progeny was indeed akin to Lochner’s spirit: a 
person has a right to his property, and it is unreasonable to use his property against him in a 
criminal proceeding.”). 
268 Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576 (1996) (citing Amar, supra 
note 267) (“The Court’s opinion exemplified both the style of formalist reasoning and the 
exaltation of property rights for which the Lochner opinion has been vilified.”).  Cloud 
equivocates on the ultimate merits of Boyd in a way Amar does not, but nonetheless sees 
Boyd and Lochner as cut from the same cloth. 
269 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 428 (1995) (“Indeed, it may be fair to say that at about the time of Lochner v. New 
York, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law posed a greater threat to activist government, at least 
at the federal level, than did substantive due process.”).  Stuntz is not unsympathetic to Boyd 
on formal doctrinal grounds.  See id. (formal arguments for Boyd “looked right”).  Yet Stuntz 
may be in another way Boyd’s harshest critic, describing Boyd as the centerpiece of a 
constitutional regime designed to shield business from humane social regulation. 
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somewhat different ways, linked Boyd with the notorious substantive due 
process decision Lochner v. New York.
270
 
Some of the evidence adduced so far indeed supports the Boyd-as-
Lochner story.  The real brief for the Boyds was written by a brilliant 
lawyer representing the New York Chamber of Commerce in testimony 
before Congress.  The Boyd opinion tracks Eaton’s arguments very closely.  
Boyd, clearly, had the effect of complicating federal regulation of business. 
Yet that story is at most only partially true.  If the Justices were really 
interested in protecting business from regulation, they would have 
reaffirmed the historical test of due process in Hurtado.  Before 1937, the 
limited federal jurisdiction over commerce made the states the most 
important source of social welfare legislation.  If Murray’s Lessee had 
remained the law, Entick would have been fastened to the states as well as 
to the federal government. 
Instead, both before and after Boyd the Court applied a flexible test of 
substantive due process to state social-welfare regulations.  Prior to 
Lochner, the leading cases were Munn v. Illinois
271
 and Holden v. Hardy.
272
  
Munn rejected a due process challenge to the Illinois “Granger Law” that 
limited what farmers could be charged by the owners of grain elevators.
273
  
Holden rejected a due process challenge to a Utah law limiting the hours 
that miners could work.
274
  Notably, Justice Bradley, the author of Boyd, 
dissented from the Court’s 1890 decision requiring quasi-judicial hearings 
in state rate-making procedures.
275
  His dissent, relying on Munn, is not an 
opinion one would expect from anyone inclined to read laissez-faire 
economics into the Constitution. 
After Boyd, the Court refused to apply either the Fourth Amendment 
or the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to the states,
276
 where 
the real threats to business interests then lay.  The post-Boyd federal cases 
upheld the constitutionality of transactional immunity against Fifth 
Amendment challenge
277
 and denied corporations the privilege against self-
 
270 185 U.S. 45 (1905). 
271 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
272 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
273 Munn, 94 U.S. at 134. 
274 Holden, 169 U.S. at 367. 
275 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
276 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to states); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to states). 
277 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).  For the plausibility of the claim that even 
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incrimination.
278
  But one year after Lochner, the Court retreated from Boyd 




There is one more reason to be skeptical of the conventional critique of 
Boyd as Lochner: Louis Brandeis.  The most eminent progressive jurist in 
American history celebrated Boyd as a great landmark of civil liberty in his 
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
280
  If Boyd were cut from the 
same cloth as Lochner, Brandeis’s Olmstead opinion would be utterly 
inexplicable. 
G. BOYD AS DOCTRINE: TWO APPARENT ANOMALIES 
The evidence presented in this Article indicates rather strongly that the 
Founders regarded papers as deserving greater protection than other effects.  
Two strands in the doctrine that emerged under Boyd might cast doubt on 
the preference for papers.  One is the Supreme Court’s extension of the 
immunity enjoyed by papers to innocent, non-forfeitable chattels other than 
documents—the mere-evidence rule.  The second is the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine, which allowed the seizure of papers from the person of a 
suspect when lawfully taken into custody.  Let us consider these potential 
counterexamples in turn. 
1. The Mere-Evidence Rule 
Papers and other effects could be put on the same plane in two ways.  
Modern cases like Burgess reduce papers to the protections for ordinary 
effects.
281
  But nondocumentary chattels might also be elevated to the status 
of papers.  That is what the Supreme Court did in the 1920s.  In Gouled v. 
United States
282
 the government had obtained papers relevant to show fraud 
and bribery, some by an undercover agent’s surreptitious theft and some by 
warrant naming specific documents to be seized.  The Court, answering 
questions certified by the Court of Appeals, stated: 
There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, 
to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of 
 
transactional immunity is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 610 (Shiras, J., 
dissenting). 
278 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70 (1906). 
279 Id. at 75–76. 
280 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing Boyd as “a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the 
United States”). 
281 See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009). 
282 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
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the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be 
adequately described in the affidavit and warrant.  Stolen or forged papers have been 
so seized . . . , and we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or 
agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest 
in them which would justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly 
issued search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.
283
 
To say that papers used to commit crimes are forfeitable and may be seized 
is not tantamount to saying that other chattels may not be seized unless they 
are forfeitable. 
I have a speculative but plausible explanation for the mere-evidence 
rule’s elevation of other chattels to the status of papers under Boyd.  
Discouraging law enforcement excesses in the investigation of possessory 
offenses required extending the Boyd rule not just to chattels other than 
documents, but indeed to contraband chattels like Prohibition-era liquor.  
The latter move was utterly contrary to the logic of Entick and Boyd, but the 
Court made the move just four years after Gouled.
284
  If we assume that the 
Justices were concerned about deterring abuses in the enforcement of 
Prohibition, Gouled, heterodox and ahistorical as it was, is explicable as the 
necessary stepping-stone to the suppression of illegal chattels like 
moonshine and cocaine.  Given the modern exclusionary rule’s explicit 
basis in deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations, today there is no 
pragmatic reason to give other chattels the same protection as “papers.” 
2. Search Incident to Arrest 
Papers can be equated with other “effects” by permitting the seizure of 
papers, rather than by barring the seizure of chattels.  We have seen that 
until the 1863 revenue measure, there had been an unbroken pattern of 
exempting documents from seizure under warrant.  Yet the search of 
persons upon arrest was a familiar Founding-era practice,
285
 and in the 
 
283 Id. at 309 (citations omitted). 
284 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 36 (1925) (holding that illegally seized cocaine 
could not be used in evidence against victim of warrantless home invasion).  The 
government argued that Agnello had waived his objection to the evidence by not filing a 
motion for return of property, then excused the defense from making a motion that, if 
granted, would have gotten the defendant rearrested on the courthouse steps.  See id. at 34.  
The truly bizarre reasoning was that the pretrial motion was required only to avoid inquiry 
into collateral facts during trial.  Since, in the instant case, the government conceded there 
was no warrant to enter, the Agnello Court said the trial court should have sustained the 
evidentiary objection during trial.  Id. at 35.  The unanimous Court, understandably, said 
nothing about what was to be done with the cocaine after trial. 
285 See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1960) 
(finding “little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee’s person and premises is as old as 
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course of searching the prisoner, documents might well be discovered.  
Search of the person arrested seems to have been so standard as to escape 
legal challenge until late in the nineteenth century.
286
 
After Boyd the collision of the search-incident power with the ban on 
seizing papers was inevitable.  The New York Court of Appeals, per that 
familiar apologist for blundering constables, Benjamin Cardozo, took the 
position that the search-incident power trumped the private-papers rule so 
that even documents not subject to forfeiture as contraband or 
instrumentalities could be seized from the person arrested.
287
  This seems 
unsound, because it permitted the police to go further without warrant than 
a judge could go by issuing one. 
Learned Hand delivered the true exposition of Entick and Boyd in the 
search-incident context.
288
  Beautifully penetrating the pooling problem, 
Hand articulated what might be called the “anti-rummaging” principle: 
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of 
whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be 
done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for 
presumably it must be issued by a magistrate.  True, by hypothesis the power would 
not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small 
consolation to know that one’s papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.  
Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their 
makers have suffered, and should go pari passu with the supposed evil. They 
withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past.
289
 
Documents, Hand declared, could only be seized when they were 
forfeitable (“[t]he forged note, the fraudulent prospectus”).290  But even 
 
the institution of arrest itself”). 
286 There is no discussion of search powers during arrest in Blackstone or in any JP 
manual I have seen.  Stephen, writing in 1883, treats arrest extensively without mentioning 
search.  1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 190–94 
(1883). 
287 People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197–98 (1923) (upholding use as evidence of 
letters taken from defendant on arrest). 
Conceding the legality of the arrest, [defendant] concedes by implication the legality of the 
search.  What he complains of is not the search but the seizure that succeeded it.  The search, we 
are told, may lawfully be made, but what is found must be returned, though it be proof positive 
of guilt, unless at the same time it is an implement of felony.  This is to carry the immunity 
beyond the bounds of reason.  
Id. 
288 See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926). 
289 Id. at 203. 
290 Id. at 204.  On this point the difference with Cardozo is theoretically important but 
practically minute, because it “is seldom that one finds a document containing evidence of 
crime which was not at one time used in its commission; the papers important in any 
prosecution are ordinarily either communications passing between the actors or records 
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when the object of the search was forfeitable, the police had no more 
constitutional power upon arrest than a judge issuing a warrant to comb 
through a vast trove of innocent papers in quest of an illegal one.  The 
Supreme Court subsequently endorsed Hand’s view, albeit temporarily.291  
V. SUMMING UP: HISTORY AS OPPORTUNITY 
A. THE CASE AGAINST EQUATING “PAPERS” AND “EFFECTS” 
If Boyd cannot be written off as the product of a vast right-wing 
conspiracy, it does not automatically follow that Boyd was right.  The 
warrant at issue in Entick was both a sweeping warrant and a warrant for 
papers.  Entick says the latter is a distinct and grievous legal wrong.  
Wigmore refused to take that feature of the opinion at face value.  The real 
issue about Boyd’s legitimacy is whether a specific warrant to seize as 
evidence papers lawfully possessed is or is not constitutionally 
“unreasonable.”  According to Wigmore, Boyd “mistreats the Fourth 
Amendment, in applying its prohibition to a returnable writ of seizure 
describing specific documents in the possession of a specific person.”292  
Others, including Justice Holmes
293
 and, more recently, Professor Davies,
294
 
have shared Wigmore’s view. 
The Boyd majority should not be dismissed too lightly.  For one thing, 
the opinion was written less than a century after the ratification of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Justices had walked the earth with the Founding 
 
necessary to keep track of the details.”  Id. 
291 Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 192 (1927) (upholding admission of 
ledger kept by operator of a speakeasy as an instrumentality in the “immediate possession 
and control” of the person arrested), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) 
(upholding search incident to arrest that extended to desk drawers and filing cabinet).  
Justice Minton’s majority opinion in Rabinowitz reversed Hand’s opinion below; Justices 
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.  Rabinowitz was subsequently repudiated by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
292 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2264 (1904) (footnotes omitted). 
293 Holmes did not join Brandeis in Olmstead but dissented on other grounds.  See Robert 
Post, Federalism, Positivism, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: 
Prohibition in the Taft Era Court, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 144 n.476 (2006) (noting in 
an internal memo about the Olmstead case, “[a]longside the sentence in which Brandeis 
observed that Boyd ‘reviewed the history that lay behind the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,’ 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), Holmes commented: ‘My impression 
was that Wigmore had thrashed the history’ set forth in Boyd”). 
294 Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: 
The Century of Supreme Court “Fourth Amendment” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 956 (2010). 
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generation.
295
  If the passage of time makes the original understanding more 
difficult to recover, the Boyd court has more than a century’s worth of an 
advantage over us. 
In the second place, one of the members of the Boyd majority was 
Horace Gray, a legal historian who compiled the first archive of primary 
sources related to the Writs of Assistance controversy.
296
  “Here, in almost 
145 pages, packed with footnotes, Gray delivered a magnificent display of 
research into the origin and use of search warrants up to and at the time of 
Otis’s arguments.”297  That archive remains “essential reading.”298  True, 
Gray was not, apparently, an originalist.
299
  But if Bradley’s opinion had 
declared false history we would expect a deep student of the controversy 
over the writs, intimate with the grandson of John Adams,
300
 to have known 
it and said something about it. 
Scholars such as Cuddihy and Clancy have concluded that the 
amendment has the dual meaning suggested by the wording finally adopted: 
a general right against unreasonable searches and seizures is declared, and a 
specific prohibition against general warrants is superimposed on the general 
declaration.
301
  If we accept the latter interpretation, as the Court has 
done,
302
 the historical record cuts strongly against applying the same criteria 
for “papers” as for other “effects.” 
First, papers are specially mentioned in the constitutional text, and in 
Madison’s proposal and Adams’s Massachusetts provision before.  Each 
provision, moreover, puts papers where you might expect from a normative 
point of view—papers ranked behind persons and houses, but ahead of all 
other “effects” or “possessions.”303 
 
295 Justice Bradley was born in 1813.  Thomas Jefferson and John Adams famously 
expired on or about the Fourth of July, 1826.  John Marshall lived until 1835. 
296 Horace Gray, Notes, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 395 (1865). 
297 Robert M. Spector, Historian on the Supreme Court: Justice Horace C. Gray, Jr. and 
the Historical Method, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 194 (1968). 
298 Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of History, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 811, 812 (2010) (book 
review). 
299 Spector, supra note 297, at 209 (“Gray viewed the Federal Constitution as a living 
organism that meant one thing in 1789, another in 1860, and still another in his own time.”). 
300 Id.  Charles Francis Adams spent “many years of friendship” with Gray, although it 
appears that Adams thought Gray an unimaginative judge.  Id. 
301 See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 10–11 (2008); CUDDIHY, supra 
note 66, at 765–82. 
302 Countless cases have held warrantless searches “unreasonable.”  See, e.g., Bond v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
303 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1772 n.89 
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Wigmore’s point that the Amendment permits reasonable searches for 
papers and therefore excludes Boyd’s per se ban is unpersuasive.  For one 
thing, even under the rigid rule of Boyd it was “reasonable” to seize stolen 
papers, obscene books, and criminal libels.  Second, if the Declaratory 
Clause is read to say that not all “searches and seizures” of “papers” are 
“unreasonable,” the Warrant Clause can equally be said to permit no 
warrant to search or seize “papers” because the Warrant Clause refers to 
places to be searched and persons or things to be seized.  “Things” 
correlates to “effects” in the Declaratory Clause, so that the distinction 
between “papers” and “things” implies that while “things” might be seized 
on a warrant, “papers” could not be. 
Proponents of treating “papers” the same as other “effects” face a 
serious challenge in the constitutional text.  If “papers” are entitled to no 
higher protection than other “effects” (or “possessions” in some of the state 
provisions), why does the text mention “papers” at all?  If it was an 
accident, why did the Massachusetts, New Hamphsire, Pennsylvania, and 
Vermont constitutions also refer specially to “papers”?  Coupling the text 
with the seizure-of-papers controversy gives a very good reason for what 
would otherwise be inexplicable. 
Second, American courts recognized Entick as part of the received 
body of English common law.  A statute might trump the common law, but 
the Fourth Amendment trumps a statute.  Justice Story wrote that the Fourth 
Amendment is “little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional 
doctrine of the common law.”304  If the Fourth Amendment incorporated the 
common law, even a common law subject to reasoned statutory and judicial 
development, the Fourth Amendment’s Declaratory Clause prohibits 
equating “papers” and “effects.” 
Third, at the heart of Whig opposition to seizing papers was the belief 
that any search of papers, even for a specific criminal item, was a general 
search.  It followed that any warrant to sift through documents is a general 
warrant, even if it is specific to the location of the trove and the item to be 
seized.  American patriots were familiar with the general warrants 
controversy in England, quite independently of any published law reports.  
They were in sympathy, in particular, with Father of Candor’s Letter 
Concerning Libels.  Every Whig pamphlet I have seen describes seizing 
papers as an abuse distinct from, but intrinsically resembling, in aggravated 
form, general warrants.  The House of Commons, in linked resolutions, 
 
(2011) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment singled out ‘papers’ for special protections above and 
beyond all other stuff—‘effects.’”). 
304 3 STORY, supra note 7, § 1895, at 748. 
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condemned general warrants and seizures of papers. 
Fourth, the earliest statutory provision authorizing search warrants for 
books and papers I have found is the 1859 Massachusetts act promptly 
declared unconstitutional in Robinson.  The Congress that adopted the 
Sedition Act did not go so far; nor did the 1780 Pennsylvania legislature 
whose initial proposal was criticized by Zuinglius.  It might be said that the 
Entick rule was limited in English law to libel cases, because the resolutions 
in the Commons were narrowly worded to gain reluctant supporters.  Father 
of Candor expressly rejected limiting the prohibition of general warrants to 
libel cases,
305
 and endorsed Candor’s earlier words about “the absolute 
illegality of the seizure of papers.”306  I have seen no American authority 
limiting the prohibition of general warrants, or the ban on seizing papers, to 
libel cases; Zuinglius in 1780 admits no such limitation.  The constitutional 
text suggests no such distinction.  Some sources suggest an exception for 
national security cases.
307
  This exception, however, would not have been 
necessary if Entick were limited to libel prosecutions. 
The positive law has closed its eyes on history.  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 flatly equates “documents, books, papers, any other 
tangible objects, and information.”308  The rule plainly contemplates “the 
seizure of electronic storage media” for “later off-site copying or 
review.”309  Today, federal agents may obtain warrants to seize and carry 
away entire troves of digitally stored private papers and peruse those files at 
remote locations, one by one.  What the leading Whig polemicist 
denounced as an “abominable outrage,” what the common law condemned 
as a relic of the Star Chamber, and what no American legislature authorized 
for the first eighty years of Independence, has become standard law 
enforcement procedure. 
 
305 FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 50. 
306 Id. at 54. 
307 CANDOR, supra note 107, at 33 (“Now, in the case of High Treason, so dangerous to 
the being of the whole state, it may not, perhaps, at particular junctures, be improper to 
support, or indemnify at least, even Secretaries of State in the seizure of papers, and of every 
thing else, however illegal, that may possible serve to a discovery and conviction of the 
Traitor.”); Zuinglius, supra note 145 (“In cases where by defection to the enemy, as lately in 
the case of Arnold, or where by taking up arms, or by other means, the treason is notorious, 
the seizure of papers is justifiable by reason, and is warranted by law already existing.”).  
Whigs did not uniformly admit a treason exception.  Cf. Glynn’s argument in Entick v. 
Carrington, (1765) 2 Wils. 275, 285 (K.B.). 
308 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
309 Id. 
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B. THE POOLING PROBLEM AND THE ALL-OR-NOTHING 
DILEMMA 
To say that the Fourth Amendment calls for special treatment of 
private documents does not answer the question of just what that special 
treatment should be.  Current doctrine seems premised on a supposed 
dilemma.  If private documents do not enjoy heightened constitutional 
status, and the government can show probable cause to believe that one 
document among thousands is either contraband or evidence, the police 
may scan the entire lot.  In some cases their suspicions will prove baseless 
and they will have searched thousands of innocent but private entries for no 
good purpose.  If, on the other hand, documents do deserve heightened 
constitutional protection, the government has no right to pick through the 
haystack in search of the needle, and documentary evidence of serious 
crimes would, as a practical matter, become off-limits to law enforcement.  
The scale of the pooling problem has changed dramatically between the 
asportation of all of Wilkes’s papers in a sack to the perusal of all the files 
on Burgess’s hard drive.  The structure of the problem has not. 
The pooling problem is not about either the lawfulness of the object of 
search or the particularity of a warrant.  In the 1760s, libels could at least 
theoretically be seized; the problem was the need to look through reams of 
innocent private papers to find the contraband ones.
310
  Under today’s 
criminal law, a meth recipe would be an instrumentality of crime and 
subject to seizure even under Boyd.  A warrant to search the suspect’s 
computer might be scrupulously limited to searching for “documents 
containing any formula for synthesizing methamphetamine.”  Because 
gangsters are unlikely to label their working files with obvious markers of 
criminality, the problem is the sheer volume of innocent files that must be 
scanned if the criminal material is to be found (or conclusively found 
absent). 
Burgess saw the dilemma as intractable and chose unrestrained police 
power as the lesser evil.  Only ten years after the failure to search Zacarias 
Moussaoui’s computer cost a chance to prevent the 9/11 attacks and all the 
horrors that have followed, the Burgess Court’s position is probably 
inevitable, if the supposed dilemma is really irreducible.  Even if Boyd 
offers the most plausible historical reading of private papers under the 
Fourth Amendment, there is zero practical prospect of a return to a per se 
ban on seizing private papers (especially if, as seems likely, this would 
logically entail a similar per se prohibition on nonconsensual electronic 
 
310 On Chief Justice Pratt’s equivocations about seizing even libelous papers, see supra 
text accompanying notes 91–96. 
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surveillance). 
What, however, if the dilemma is false?  What if heightened but not 
absolute protections for private documents—like those proposed by Chief 
Judge Kozinski or contained in the British legislation—had legitimate roots 
in text and history?  We have taken similar approaches to at least some 
highly intrusive search-and-seizure practices.  Wiretap orders by statute are 
considerably more demanding than ordinary search warrants, and their 
execution is subject to a duty to minimize interception of innocent 
conversations.
311
  The Court has held that a court order based on probable 
cause is not enough to make compelled surgery to recover a bullet 
“reasonable.”312  Probable cause and an exigent circumstance alone are not 
enough to justify arrest by gunshot.
313
  Some middle ground might be 
legitimate as well as sensible. 
C. BEYOND ALL OR NOTHING 
The seizures of Entick’s and Wilkes’s papers were indiscriminate, 
expropriating, unregulated, and inquisitorial.  These same objections were 
raised, with considerable justice, against the 1863 customs statute.  The 
revised statute that came before the Court in Boyd attempted an ingenious 
solution to the pooling problem, i.e., the sorting of the pool by the suspects 
themselves.  As Justice Miller pointed out at the time, and Richard 
Nagareda argued a century later, the Court could have dealt with the statute 
before it solely on Fifth Amendment grounds.
314
 
The Boyd majority seemed eager to strike down the 1863 statute, 
which was no longer in force.  The majority never really grappled with 
whether the disclose-or-admit procedure was in any pertinent way similar to 
the warrants in Wilkes and Entick.  Eaton had swung for the fences, for all 
or nothing, and won his wager. 
One wonders how the Boyd majority would have ruled if Congress had 
adopted the reforms proposed by Eaton’s colleague Cephas Brainerd rather 
than the disclose-or-confess arrangement.  Brainerd proposed a 
particularized warrant, and permitted only a judicially supervised seizure 
for inspection and copying, limited at most to twelve days, with a right to 
 
311 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). 
312 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1995). 
313 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
314 See Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of 
Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999).  Nagareda supposed that Boyd was wrong on Fourth 
Amendment grounds and private papers could be seized on a warrant.  The evidence 
assembled here, and by Professor Schnapper earlier, indicates at the very least that Boyd’s 
private-papers holding was not implausible. 
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attend the inspection personally and through counsel, and to preserve 
exculpatory evidence for trial.
315
  These reforms would have made warrant 
practice discriminate, minimally rivalrous, and closely regulated.  Brainerd 
offered them as permissible under a “liberal construction” of the Fourth 
Amendment “in favor of the government.” 
Eaton would surely have maintained his Fourth Amendment objection 
to any warrant to seize papers for use as evidence.  Today that argument is 
academic, in the pejorative sense.  The contemporary Supreme Court, 
repelled by the practical consequences of making papers inviolate, has all 
but abandoned Boyd.  As things stand, some protection for personal 
documents would move the law closer to the original understanding and 
strike a better normative balance between personal privacy and public 
security in a digital age. 
There is, moreover, a powerful argument that the original 
understanding did permit narrow, brief, and regulated seizures of papers.  
Search upon arrest was a familiar feature of Founding-era practice, and was 
not challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds until after Boyd.  I have no 
specific instance of Founding-era seizures of papers incident to arrest, but 
likewise there is no known instance of a court holding the seizure of papers 
from an arrested person to be unconstitutional. 
Judge Hand’s anti-rummaging principle offers a principled resolution 
for how to respect the special value of private documents without 
precluding their seizure altogether.  In Hand’s account, all of the arrested 
person’s papers could be seized, and then inspected.  The government then 
had the right to retain for trial any that qualified as fruits, contraband, or 
instrumentalities.  Hand saw a world of difference between seizing papers 
from the immediate control of a person under arrest and searching a 
houseful of private papers. 
That distinction has normative appeal.  Even when the government has 
probable cause to believe a criminal document can be found in a pool of 
innocent documents, at some point the exposure of innocent information 
becomes a greater evil than the loss of evidence.  A better-than-even chance 
that a drug transaction or a lewd image of a child can be found in a desk 
drawer is very different than a better-than-even chance that the same items 
can be found in one of a million desk drawers. 
Hand limited the search for papers to the immediate area of the 
arrested person, thus placing a sharp practical limit on the scope of the 
seizure.  Any seizure of papers was to be brief and regulated, because the 
officer was bound to bring the suspect promptly before a magistrate.  And it 
 
315 See BRAINERD, supra note 228, at 16–18. 
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was to be minimally intrusive; the suspect could make little use of papers 
while in handcuffs or in jail, and as soon as he was released from custody 
he could obtain the return of any innocent papers taken. 
Prior to the advent of digital technology, Hand’s anti-rummaging norm 
offered a characteristically principled adjudication of the tension between 
Founding-era respect for papers and Founding-era acceptance of search 
powers implied by lawful arrest.  Today the arrested person is likely to 
carry a cell phone, tablet, or flash drive on the person that can store more 
pages of text than Jack Wilkes read in his lifetime, let alone the lot that was 
carried off in a sack.  In today’s technological environment, the anti-
rummaging principle Hand logically derived from Entick would not 
countenance either the search of thousands of files incident to arrest, or 
even pursuant to a search warrant for criminal files that might—and might 
not—be among the thousands of files to be scanned.  At least the principle 
would not countenance such searches without limiting procedures of the 
sort proposed by Chief Judge Kozinski. 
The anti-rummaging principle, then, suggests curtailing the warrantless 
seizure and search of digital devices incident to arrest.  And it suggests that 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s opinion in Comprehensive Drug Testing is not, as 
Judge Callahan argued, without “legal authority.”  On the contrary, that 
basic approach is supported by our highest legal authority, the text of the 
Constitution in historical context.
316
   
There are difficult questions about both the substance of structural 
safeguards on digital searches, and about the institutions best equipped to 
formulate those safeguards.  All I have suggested here is that safeguards 
that greatly reduce the special evils that attended the seizures of papers in 
the 1760s might make digital-age Fourth Amendment law simultaneously 
more legitimate and more functional.  If that turns out to be true, the time 
may come when structuring digital searches is not just best practice, but 
also the only practice that is not “unreasonable.” 
 
316 Compare United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“The warrant application should normally include, or the issuing judicial officer 
should insert, a protocol for preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining 
or retaining any data other than that for which probable cause is shown.”), with Entick, 19 
How. St. Tr. at 1072 (“If libels are to be seized, it ought to be laid down with precision, 
when, where, upon what charge, against whom, by what magistrate, and in what stage of the 
prosecution.”), and FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 108, at 58 (“[I]f a positive oath be made, 
and such a particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon the paper or thing 
sworn to and specified, and in the presence of the owner, or somebody intrusted by him, with 
the custody of it.”). 
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